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NEW MEXICO WATER LAW SINCE 1955
ROBERT EMMET CLARK*

Hutchins published The New Mexico Law of Water Rights' in 1955 and
it has been given wide circulation by the State Engineer and the State Bar of
New Mexico. Since 1955 there have been a number of important developments
in water law in the state and in the nation. The Pelton dam decision 2 in 1955
by the United States Supreme Court revived some old questions and raised
some new ones also. Other recent decisions by federal courts as, for example,
the Hawthorne case,8 together with the legislative proposals placed before Congress, 4 as a result of these decisions, emphasize dynamic and unexplored dimensions of the federal system.5 This article is addressed primarily to recent
* Professor of Law, The University of New Mexico
1. Technical Report No. 4, State Engineer of New Mexico in cooperation with the
U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Santa Fe, 1955. Hutchins' earlier work still widely used is
Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West, published in U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture Misc. Pub. No. 418 (1942). Hutchins has recently completed studies of several
states and he is continuing his work covering all of the western states. His case gathering,
descriptive and compendious method has been criticized for its lack of analysis, see
Goldberg, Book Review, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 420 (1957).
2. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955). See Munro, The Pelton
Decision: .4 New Riparianism?, 36 Ore. L. Rev. 221 (1957).
3. See e.g., Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F.Supp. 600 (D. Nev.
1958), aff'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Fallbrook
Pub. Util. Dist., 165 F.Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958) ; Rank v. United States, 142 F.Supp.
1 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960). On national policy
issues in particular see Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958),
reversing the California Supreme Court in 306 P.2d 875 (1957). The decision of the
United States Supreme Court is noted in 28 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 106 (1958) ; 47 Calif. L.
Rev. 499 (1959) ; 44 A.B.A.J. 1198 (1958).
4. The original proposal acquired the name of "the Barrett bill," S. 863, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1956). See Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights
Settlement Bill of 1957, 45 Calif. L. Rev. 604 (1957). This legislative proposal which did
not pass inspired numerous imitations, modifications and compromise measures, including four bills now pending which, if not identical in form, are the same in purpose:
H.R. 5078, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (Aspinall) "A bill to promote harmony between
the United States and the States of the Union with respect to the administration of water,
to strengthen rights to the use of water acquired under State law, and for other purposes.
." H.R. 5100, H.R. 5207, and H.R. 5224, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), have the same
titles. The final report of the Senate Select Committee, S.R. No. 29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961), p. 19, makes no specific recommendation for legislation beyond advocating federal "cooperation with the States" and statement that "The committee hopes that appropriate legislation to implement these recommendations will be introduced. .. ."
5. See Engelbert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 325 (1957) ; Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the Federal-State Relation-
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New Mexico decisions and statutory changes. Additional attention is given to
interstate and national consequences of local water law doctrine.6 For convenience the material is arranged in three sections: Surface water decisions and
legislation, ground water law, and, lastly, the local and regional implications
of federal-state relations in water resources policy.

I
SURFACE WATER

Recent Decisions: The New Mexico Supreme Court has reviewed comparatively few decisions during the past seven years that have involved, directly
or indirectly, some aspect of surface water use. However, two of these decisions,

Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co. 7 and State ex rel Reynolds v. W. S. Ranch Co., 8

are of far-reaching significance. In the original Cartwright9 case it was held,
with two judges dissenting, that the inhabitants of Las Vegas were entitled to
a priority under the Pueblo Rights doctrine going back to the establishment of
the community. The action was brought by water users of the Gallinas River
against the Public Service Company for injunctive relief, damages and apportionment of the water that the Town of Las Vegas, and the water company,
were distributing. The court decided that the water company could withdraw
as much water of the Gallinas as was necessary for the inhabitants of the community. My criticism of this decision was published elsewhere. 10 The question
of the application of the Doctrine of Pueblo Rights as it applies to ground water
ship, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 43 (1960) ; Note, Federal-State Conflicts Over the Control of
Western Waters, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 967 (1960) ; Sondheim & Alexander, Federal Indian
Water Rights: 4 Retrogression to Quasi-Ripa-ianism?, 34 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1960) ;
King, Federal-State Relations in the Control of Water Resources, 37 U. of Det. L. J. 1
(1959) ; Martz, The Role of the Federal Government in State Water Law, 5 Kan. L. Rev.
626 (1957) ; Trelease, Government O'wnership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 Calif. L.
Rev. 638 (1957).
6. See e.g., United States v. Ballard, 184 F.Supp. 1 (D. N.M. 1960) ; El Paso County
Water Improvement Dist. v. City of El Paso, 133 F.Supp. 894 (W.D. Tex. 1955),
modified in 243 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co., 66 N.M. 64,
343 P.2d 654 (1958), noted in 35 N.M. Historical Rev. 265 (1960).
7. 66 N.M. 64:, 343 P.2d 654 (1959) (Case No. 1) ; 68 N.M. 418, 362 P.2d 796 (1961)
(Case No. 2).
8. 69 N.M. 169, 364 P.2d 1036 (1961).
9. 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654 (1959).
10. Clark, The Pueblo Rights Doctrine in New Mexico, 35 N.M. Historical Rev. 265
(1960).
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was recently before the New Mexico Supreme Court." The second Cartwright
case' 2 upheld the dismissal of a complaint filed by plaintiffs in the first case.
The plaintiffs alleged that the original Spanish or Mexican land grant was made
to the "Town of Las Vegas Grant" and not to the "Town of Las Vegas" as
determined in the first case. It was also alleged that the second suit was a proper
continuation of the first as provided for in a statute'" (23-1-14) but which the
court held' 4 "has no application to a case where judgment on the merits has been
rendered" and, therefore, "the conclusion is inescapable that all issues raised in
plaintiffs' complaint in this section were adjudicated in the first case and the
matter is res judicata." The recent Albuquerque case,' 8 in which the municipality relied heavily upon the original Cartwright decision, is discussed in a
subsequent section.
State ex rel. Reynolds v. W. S. Ranch Co. 16 was an action by the State Engineer to enjoin New Mexico defendant company from diversion of surface
waters above Costilla Reservoir. The district court dismissed for lack of indispensable parties, viz, the other water users on the stream system. The Supreme
Court affirmed with leave to reinstate the action when the users below the reservoir were made parties; it also held that even though the Costilla Creek Compact of 1945,17 between New Mexico and Colorado, apportioned waters of
the stream, "the Colorado water users were not indispensable parties." The court
relied on Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,' 8 which
held that any apportionment of water between states is binding on the citizens of
each state.
In Wj.S. Ranch Co. the court said:
We reaffirm the principles announced in those decisions [holding
that State engineer's jurisdiction over ground water is limited but may
be exercised under the police power to enjoin waste or excessive use].
But we do not construe the statute to authorize the state engineer
11. City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, State Engineer, decided December 14, 1962.

The indications are that there will be a petition for rehearing. The actual decision turns
on jurisdictional and evidentiary questions rather than questions of pueblo rights. The
Supreme Court said that:
We therefore hold that all of the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
district court relating to the Pueblo of San Felipe de Albuquerque and the
claimed pueblo water right, should be striken as not being within the issues
properly before the court, and the judgment of the district court, insofar as it
is based upon such findings and conclusions should be reversed.
12. Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co., 68 N.M. 418, 362 P.2d 796 (1961).
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-14 (1953).
14. Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co., 68 N.M. 418, 420, 362 P.2d 796, 797 (1961).
15. See note 11 supra.
16. 69 N.M. 169, 364 P.2d 1036 (1961).
17. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-34-3 (1953).
18. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
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either in the exercise of the State's police, or as a representative of other
water users, to seek an adjudication of other water rights of one

making a bona fide claim thereto which would affect the right of
others, without the joinder of those persons whose rights may be
affected. 19
The decision casts some doubt on portions of the court's past work. The court
treated the case as an adjudication suit: "Whatever position the State Engineer
takes in this action, it cannot be divorced from an adjudication of appellee's
claimed water right. . .

."

Yet in Pecos Valley v. Peters20 the court said that

an injunction suit was not an adjudication suit. There is further confusion in
the court's reference, in conjunctive fashion, to "necessary and indispensable
parties." Litigation can proceed in some instances without necessary parties,
but without indispensable parties it cannot. 21 This, also, raises the possibility
of class actions under Rule 2322 which might have been allowed by an interpretation of section 75-2-9 to authorize the State Engineer to bring the suit
on behalf of all water users. This would seem to be the reasoning of Peters and
this would eliminate the possibility of inconsistent results. However, the court
completely rejected the view of the State Engineer that the statute providing
that "The state engineer shall have the supervision of the apportionment of
water in this state . . .-23 could mean that "The state engineer represents all
other water users and all other citizens of the state to prevent appellant from
exercising the rights it claims."
Another question is raised by W. S. Ranch Co. with respect to "piecemeal"
adjudication as approved in ground water matters in State ex rel. Reynolds v.
Sharp.24 It would seem that the feasible and pragmatic approach in Sharp may
now be questionable in actions involving surface waters.
In none of the surface water cases were substantial questions raised over the
acquisition of new rights, or over transfers of such rights, although the question of prescriptive rights as against claimants below the Costilla Reservoir
was raised in the W. S. Ranch Co. case. All of the recent decisions, including
the three discussed above, emphasize what is already common knowledge:
surface waters in New Mexico have long been fully appropriated except for
19. 69 N.M. 169, 173, 364 P.2d 1036, 1038-39 (1961) (emphasis added).
20. 50 N.M. 165, 173 P.2d 490 (1945) ; 52 N.M. 148, 193 P.2d 418 (1948).
21. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (17) (a) (1953). If Rule 17a was not applicable, then the

users are probably indispensable parties under Rule 19.
22. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (23) (1953).
23. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-2-9 (1953). See State ex rel. Reynolds v. W.S. Ranch Co.,
69 N.M. 169, 172, 364 P.2d 1036, 1038 (1961).
24. 66 N.M. 192, 344 P.2d 943 (1959).
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some supplies from the Canadian River and what may be diverted or imported
25
from the Upper Colorado Basin.
This handful of decisions also seems to indicate that the devices for transferring surface rights provided by statute 26 are not greatly involved in litigation although there are indications that they are being used. 27 Yet we know very
little about the utility of these sections of the statutes, which date from 1907,
in terms of altered patterns of use arising from the rapid economic growth of
the state. The absence of such recent surface water litigation might lead some
to believe that adequate statutory methods exist for change and expansion. But
the absence of litigation also seems to support many of the reasons given two
generations ago for establishing an administrative system.2 8 The experience in
Colorado where such a system has never fully developed presents a sharp
29
contrast.
Two decisions, one of them by the court of appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1952,30 not reported by Hutchins, were the result of the extreme drought conditions along the Rio Grande in the 1940's and 1950's. The later case, Elephant
Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Gatlin,31 was decided in 1956 by the state Supreme

Court. The alleged wrong was the diversion of Rio Grande water to Bosque
del Apache National Wild Life Refuge north of Elephant Butte Reservoir.
An injunction was granted by the state court against a subordinate official of
the United States Department of Interior. The Supreme Court dismissed the
action on the ground that the game refuge was lawfully established in aid of
a U.S. treaty with Mexico and the Migratory Bird Conservation legislation of
Congress. Thus the United States was held to be an indispensable party. The
court held that a judgment for the Irrigation District would "expend itself
upon the United States, its properties and administration and that . . . the

United States had not consented to be sued." 3 2 The earlier case in the court
25. See Senate Select Comm. on National Water Resources, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,

Views and Comments of the States 229-33 (Comm. Print No. 6, 1960), for the Statement
of the New Mexico State Engineer. San Juan-Chama Authorization.
26. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-5-21 to -24 (1953).
27. File No. 3665, State Engineer's Office (Albuquerque) refers to application for
change from surface to ground water diversion by Kaiser-Gypsum Company at the new
Rosario plant in the Rio Grande Basin. The Rio Grande Underground Water Basin
Order No. 65, and the 8-page memorandum accompanying it, Nov. 29, 1956, anticipate
such transfers.
28. See Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258 (1900) ; Cf. Board of
Water Engineers v. McKnight, 111 Tex. 82, 229 S.W. 301 (1921).

29. See Lasky, From PriorAppropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by the
State-FiaIrrigation Administration, 1 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 161, 248 (1929), and 2 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 35 (1929) ; Danielson, Water Administration in Colorado-Higher-orityor
Priority,30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 293 (1958).
30. New Mexico v. Backer, 199 F.2d 426 (10th Cir. 1952).
31. 61 N.M. 58,294 P.2d 628 (1956).
32. Id. at 68, 294 P.2d at 635.
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of appeals was cited. This previous decision, State v. Backer,3 3 was an effort
by the state and a municipality to enjoin reduction in the level of Elephant
Butte Reservoir. The action was brought against the construction engineer in
charge of Elephant Butte Dam and Reservoir and employees of the Bureau
of Reclamation. A temporary injunction was granted by the state court on the
ground that lower water levels and the death of fish in the lake presented a
health menace. The United States removed to federal court and the action
was dismissed. The court of appeals affirmed holding that the action was in
essence a suit against the United States to which it had not consented. The
court relied on the United States Supreme Court case of Larsen v. Domestic
Foreign Corp.3 4 for its decision.
State ex rel. Bliss v. Davis in 1957- 5 also involved an interstate stream, the
Pecos. The district court for Eddy County refused to enjoin diversions from
the river and the Supreme Court affirmed. The State Engineer brought the
action on the theory that the rights claimed had never been perfected, or had
been forfeited for non-use for four years, or were foreclosed by the Hope decree.38 Davis relied on the declaration of water rights filed in the county clerk's
office in 1903. The court held that there was substantial evidence of the ancient
water right. However, the court referred to two earlier cases 37 "in which the
forfeiture statute . . . has been construed but not in the respect here mentioned" and then stated that it was "neither necessary nor proper to decide
the question here, having no application to the facts. Hence we pass the question until it arises in a case where its decision is absolutely necessary." In addition the court mentioned and avoided the question "whether the State itself
33. 61 N.M. 58, 294 P.2d 628 (1956).
34. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
35. 63 N.M. 322, 319 P.2d 207 (1957).
36. Id. at 329-30, 319 P.2d at 211-12: "The defendant, J. C. Davis, was adjudged to
be the owner of a valid right to appropriate water to the extent of three acre feet, per
acre, per annum upon the 320 acres of land above described in Eddy County, New Mexico,
as declared in the decree, subject only to the rights of the remaining defendants under
existing purchase contracts. And as may very well have been declared in said decree
but was not, the water right adjudged to defendant Davis is, of course, subject, further
and necessarily to the unadjudicated rights and priorities, whatever they may be, as between him, Davis, and all water users of the Pecos River, as settled and determined
by the decree in . . . Cause No. 712, Equity, entitled Hope Community Ditch v. U.S. ...
"Perhaps the most hotly contested issue presented at the trial was in the effort of
counsel for the plaintiff [the State Engineer] to secure the admission in evidence of portions of the hydrographic survey made under the supervision of the State Engineer for
use in the trial of Equity Cause No. 712. . . ." (United States District Court for N.M.,
1933).
37. Id. at 331, 319 P.2d at 213, citing Chavez v. Gutierrez, 54 N.M. 76, 213 P.2d 597
(1950) ; New Mexico Products Co. v. New Mexico Power Co., 42 N.M. 311, 77 P.2d 634
(1938).
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can be estopped to assert its rights [of forfeiture] in the administration of the
public waters of the State. Hence we pass a decision on this matter raised in
the case. Compare State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 364 P.2d
983 (1957)."31 The McLean case cited is a ground water decision holding
that waste or non-beneficial use is a basis for forfeiture.
Martinez v. Mundy3 9 affirmed the trial court's finding that the use of the
Mundy Tract near Chama for pasturage and livestock watering was permissive and not adverse. Therefore no rights to such water or land use was acquired by prescription. The decision adds additional weight to the conclusion
that water rights cannot be acquired by prescription in New Mexico. This pre40
cise question was asked in 1937 in Pioneer Ditch Co. v. Blashek where Judge

Brice said: "This testimony does not prove an abandonment of plaintiff's water
right, nor a prescriptive right (if such a right can be acquired under our law).
. ." 41 As pointed out above, the W. S. Ranch Co. case raised the question of

prescriptive rights also.
Rascoe v. Town of Farmington42 affirmed a judgment on a jury verdict for
damages against a municipality. The town was held liable for interfering with
an irrigator's source of supply with resultant loss or damage to the plaintiff's
crop. Laterals supplying the ditch had been filled up in 1954. Although the
testimony was confusing as to who had filled in the laterals, the Supreme Court
held that the evidence sustained the jury's finding that it was done by or under
authority of the town. The court rejected any basis for punitive damages even
though the word "wilfully" was used in the pleadings and instructions to describe the town's conduct. The court stated the rule that exemplary damages
are not allowable against a municipality in the absence of statute.43 The court
made no mention of Rix v. Town of Alamogordo,4 4 decided in 1938, which

allowed damages against a municipality for having improperly constructed a
culvert that was not large enough to accommodate flood waters. This old case
is not cited by Hutchins in his 1955 work. However, the principles in Rascoe
and Rix would seem to be the same, viz., that a municipality may be liable for
blocking an irrigation ditch or in providing an inadequate drainage canal. Both
cases proceeded on negligence theories. The Alamogordo case is digested under
that heading which probably explains why it was not cited by Hutchins. The
Farmington case is indexed under Waters and Watercourses.
38. Id. at 334, 319 P.2d at 215.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

61 N.M. 87, 295 P.2d 209 (1956).
41 N.M. 99, 64 P.2d 388 (1937).
Id. at 102, 64 P.2d at 390 (emphasis added).
62 N.M. 51, 304 P.2d 575 (1956).
Id. at 55, 304 P.2d at 577.
42 N.M. 325, 77 P.2d 765 (1938).
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Stahmann v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist.45 affirmed the trial court's
refusal to interfere in the management and administration of the district and
dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Land owners in the district had sued for refunds
for "excess water" charges for two years. The district had assessed the charges
on a graduated scale in excess of a one-acre foot minimum to all users in the
district. The court held that in the absence of fraud, actual or constructive,
there was no abuse of discretion by the district officials merely because the assessment charges were not based on cost of delivery.
Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co.,46 mentioned above, established the Pueblo
Rights doctrine previously rejected by the court.4 7 The court held that the
Hope decree adjudicating the waters of the Pecos and tributaries did not limit
or bind the town or city of Las Vegas. After the New Mexico Supreme Court
rendered its decision, a petition for a "writ of assistance" in the United States
District Court was denied. The United States District Judge held that the
federal court had no continuing jurisdiction in the matter. 48 As discussed above
49
the second Cartwrightdecision held that matters in dispute were res judicata.
The second part of the doctrine implicit in Cartwright,i.e., its application to
ground water, was rejected in the Albuquerque case 50 recently decided by the
state Supreme Court.
In State ex rel. Reynolds v. Bd. of County Commissions of Guadalupe
County,5 decided February 28, 1962, the Supreme Court reversed the trial
court which had dismissed a mandamus action by the State Engineer in connection with the creation of a water subdistrict along the Pecos River system.
The Supreme Court held that the alternative writ was improperly dismissed
because the respondent Commissioners were chargeable with the performance
of a ministerial duty in carrying out the requirements of the statute 2 (.75-3-4)
regarding the establishment of water districts and the placing of assessments on
the tax rolls. The State Engineer had sehsonably tendered requests for find45. 61 N.M. 68, 294 P.2d 636 (1956).
46. 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654 (1958). See notes 7 and 9 supra.
47. See New Mexico Products Co. v. New Mexico Power Co., 42 N.M. 311, 77 P.2d
634 (1938) ; State ex rel. Community Ditches v. Tularosa Community Ditch, 19 N.M.

352, 143 P.2d 207 (1914).
48. See Clark, The Pueblo Rights Doctrine in New Mexico, 35 N.M. Historical Rev.
265 (1960). The article makes reference to the sequence of events after Cartwright.
49. Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co., 68 N.M. 418, 362 P.2d 796 (1961). See note 12
supra.
50. Albuquerque Case,supra note 11.
51. No. 6618, mimeographed opinion. The motion for rehearing was still pending
on December 21, 1962.
52. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-3-4 (1953) requires that when a Water Master's budget is
received by the Board of County Commissioners, they shall immediately cause the county
treasurer to extend the tax rolls in the amounts required to be raised without reference
to whether the act to be done is proper.
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ings of fact and conclusions of law which the trial court failed to act upon.
However, the Commissioners contended that lower court's recital in its order,
which indicated that the State Engineer had not shown the necessity for such
a subdistrict, constituted a sufficient finding for review purposes. The Supreme
Court rejected this contention, stating that such a conclusion would ignore the
mandatory requirement of Rule 52(b) 5 that findings and conclusions shall
54
be made when requested in non-jury actions as the court has previously held.
Legislation: The basic water law of New Mexico was enacted in 1907.15
This code referred to surface waters only. The 1911 Constitution embraced the
appropriation theory and declared all unappropriated surface waters to be public."6 There is no specific reference to ground water in the Constitution. There
have been numerous amendments to and changes in the original statutes, the
most notable being the ground water statutes of 1927 and 1931. The recent
amendments from 1953 through 1961 represent continued effort to improve
the administrative process established in 1907 in the effort to provide efficient
57
and fair allocation and in order to secure existing rights. A 1959 section
largely codifies or formalizes the practices long followed in declaring ancient
water rights. A method is prescribed for putting such claims on record. The
declaration must be verified where possible but may be stated on information
and belief. The amendment provides that it may be filed in the office of the
county clerk in the county of the diversion works but it must also be filed in
the State Engineer's office.
Several 1953 amendments58 give county commissioners power to condemn
water rights under eminent domain procedures in order to provide for county
water systems in un-incorporated communities. These sections also provide for
financing community water systems through bond issues. A significant change
in 1955 now requires the State Engineer to "permit the amount allowed to be
diverted at a rate consistent with good agricultural practices and which will
result in the most effective use of available water in order to prevent waste." 59
The same amendment also limits the amount diversified to "water allowed by
permit or by adjudication." The old rigid and pioneer formula for diversion
was based on flow at the rate of "one cubic foot of water per second for each
53. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (52b) (1953).
54. Laumbach v. Laumbach, 58 N.M. 248, 270 P.2d 385 (1954).
55. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 49, often called the New Mexico Water Code (N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 75-1-1 to -5 (1953)). Earlier legislation in the Territory, going back to the
Kearny Code of 1846, § 1, Watercourses, Stock Marks, etc., recognized the general princiciple of appropriation and the protection of existing uses.
56. N.M. Const. art. 16, §§ 1-3. The Constitution was adopted Jan. 21, 1911. New
Mexico became a state Jan. 6, 1912.
57. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-1-2.1 (1953).
58. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-4-1.1 to -1.11 (Supp. 1961).
59. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-17 (Supp. 1961).
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70 acres, or the equivalent thereof, delivered on the land."' 0 There would not
seem to be any conflict over application of the new amendment in areas like
the Middle Rio Grande Valley which have few adjudicated rights and for
which permits have not been issued. In the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District since 1951 the directors, in consultation with the chief engineer of
the district, have been "specifically empowered to make such proper and
necessary distribution and allocation of the waters available for irrigation
within such districts .. .as [they] shall determine to be reasonable and
proper ... ",
It should be noted here that this statute, although not called into question in
Middle Rio Grande Water Users Ass'n v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
Dist02 in 1953, has considerably more relevance than might appear as a result
of that case. The case is scarcely mentioned by Hutchins6 3 in his 1955 work
and then not on the most significant point of the decision. The litigation arose
over the validity of a contract between the federal government and the Middle
Rio Grande District under which the federal government agreed to acquire
and cancel outstanding bonds of the District, rehabilitate and extend the irrigation and drainage system of the District and also improve or rectify the channel
of the Rio Grande. The Water Users Association composed of farmers within
the boundaries of the District challenged the contract and its proposed effect on
their water rights. The contract was upheld except for one objectionable section later amended and approved before the mandate went down. The significance of the case lies in the approval of the limitation on delivery of water under
a federal reclamation contract. The court upheld the 160-acre limitation. This
was several years before the question reached the United States Supreme Court
in Ivanhoe IrrigationDist. v. McCracken, 4 where 160 acre contract limitations
65
were upheld and the Supreme Court of California was reversed.
In 1941 and 1957 there were amendments6 6 to the surface water forfeiture
statute to excuse non-use beyond the irrigator's control, as is recognized in
several cases. 67 The 1957 amendment expressly exempted land put in the Soil
Bank from the four-year non-use forfeiture action. A number of 1959 provi60. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 49, § 43.
61. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-28-29 (1953).
62. 57 N.M. 287, 258 P.2d 391 (1953).
63. Hutchins, supra note 1, at 22, 23, 26.
64. 357 U.S. 275 (1958). See Taylor, Excess Land Law: Pressure v. Principle, 47
Calif. L. Rev. 4-99 (1959).
65. 47 Cal. App.2d 597, 306 P.2d 824 (Sup. Ct. 1957) Albanico v. Madera Irrigation
Dist., 47 Cal. App.2d 695, 306 P.2d 894 (Sup. Ct. 1957) Santa Barbara County Water
Agency v. All Persons and Parties, 47 Cal. App.2d 699, 306 P.2d 875 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
66. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-26 (1953).
67. Chavez v. Gutierrez, 54 N.M. 76, 213 P.2d 597 (1950), cites the following: Pioneer
Irrigating Ditch Co. v. Blashek, 41 N.M. 99, 64 P.2d 388 (1937) ; New Mexico Products
Co. v. New Mexico Power Co., 42 N.M. 311, 77 P.2d 634 (1938).
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sions6 s cover the water needs for highway construction and airports. These provide that the highway commission
. . . shall make application to the State Engineer for a change of location of use, a change of method of use, change of point of diversion,
advance withdrawals or withdrawals of accrued unused waters of any
water right, whether such water right be for surface, subsurface, arte-

sian or underground waters and whether or not either the location of
the changed use of the location of the point of diversion or both be
within or without the boundaries of any declared underground water

basin or irrigation or conservancy district ....

69

The amendment further provides that for purposes named-"construction,
ie-construction, maintenance or repair of public roads, streets, highways and
airports"-the State Engineer may authorize changes in location of use, method
of use, point of diversion and advance or accrued withdrawals "after publication and hearing as provided in § 75-11-3" which is a section of the ground
water statute of 1931.70 The application may be granted if in the opinion of
the State Engineer such changes or withdrawals "will not be detrimental to the
other holders of water rights."'7 The other 1959 provisions limit advance withdrawals of ground waters to five times the annual amount of the right held
and limit the time to a period not to exceed five years or in the State Engineer's
discretion.7 2 Provisions are also made for a periodic accounting of withdrawals
by the highway commission. 73 The same sections provide for reversion of accrued
or unused water to the status of unappropriated water where the highway commission attempts to transfer its right. 74 However, under the same section the

commission may transfer a right within the same basin to a new point of diversion. No right can "exceed five times the annual amount of the water right
retained." 75
The amended forfeiture provision for non-use found in the surface water
statute76 does not contain the one-year extension period that is found in the
77
groundwater forfeiture statute.
Minor changes were made in the irrigation districts sections 78 of the statutes.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75,
76.
77.
78.

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-5-32 to -36 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-32 (Supp. 1961) (emphasis added).
N.M. Laws 1931, ch. 131, § 3.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-32 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-5-33, -34 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-34 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §75-5-35 (Supp. 1961).
Ibid.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-26 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-8 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-22-15,-31; 75-24-49; 75-26-8 (Supp. 1961).
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These are mainly concerned with bond issues, borrowing limitations and compensation of directors and the secretary.
The 1955 amendment of the conservancy district reclamation contract act 79
inspired a four-sentence per curiam decision 8 0 that construed § 75-32-26 to
mean that the legislature had intended "three" and not four election precincts.
The conservancy district act originally passed in 192781 was amended in
195982 so as to provide for an elected board of directors. Directors of the districts' 100,000 acres or more formed before July 1, 1952 had previously been
appointed by the conservancy court. 83 This change was inspired by the formation
4
of the Sandia Flood Control District under the General Conservancy Act."
The practical effect of the change so far has been negative in terms of going forward with flood control plans for the Bernalillo County area.
A new section added to the statutes in 1959 is entitled the Boat Act.8 5 The
stated purpose of the legislation is "to promote safety for persons and property
in and connected with the use, operation and equipment of vessels and to promote uniformity of laws relating thereto." 8 6 This section calls attention to
87
the increasing recreational uses of water and the holding in an earlier case
that such uses are beneficial uses.
The Interstate Stream Commission legislation has been changed principally
to aid programs of construction and financing property acquisitions in connection with relations with the United States.88 The question may be raised here
as to whether the State Engineer, who is the chief water administrator and
technical expert for the state, should continue to be a voting member of the
Interstate Stream Commission. In effect he is now an important interstate and
intrastate policy maker. With the enactment of the State Planning Act 89
(4-20-1) in 1959 which has among its purposes "planning for the long range,
79. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-32-25 to -43 (Supp. 1961).
80. McKenzie v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 59 N.M. 481, 286 P.2d 596 (1955).
81. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-28-1 to -48 (1953). See In re Sandia Conservancy Dist., 57
N.M. 413, 259 P.2d 577 (1953) ; Middle Rio Grande Water Users Ass'n v. Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy Dist., 57 N.M. 287, 258 P.2d 391 (1953). See also Cater v. Sunshine
Valley Conservancy Dist., 33 N.M. 583, 274 Pac. 52 (1928) ; In re Proposed Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy Dist., 31 N.M. 188, 242 Pac. 683 (1925) ; In re Arch Hurley Conservancy Dist., 52 N.M. 34, 191 P.2d 338 (1948) ; Gutierrez v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 34 N.M. 346, 282 Pac. 1, 70 A.L.R. 1261 (1929), cert. denied 280 U.S.
610 (1930).
82. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-28-41,-48 (Supp. 1961).
83. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-28-4 (1953).
84. See In re Sandia Conservancy Dist., 57 N.M. 413, 259 P.2d 577 (1953).
85. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-35-1 to -22 (Supp. 1961).
86. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-35-2 (Supp. 1961).
87. State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d
421 (1947).
88. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-34-9 to -27 (Supp. 1961). See also Senate Select Comm.,
Statement of New Mexico 228, 238 (Comm. Print No. 6), Note 25 Supra.
89. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-20-1 (1953).
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comprehensive, balanced development of the state's natural, economic, and
human resources and public facilities . . ." it would seem the argument is even

stronger for separating as much as possible technical functions from policymaking in the State Engineer's office. His technical and administrative services
could be made fully available without his being a voting member and officer
of the commission. 0 There are time-honored reasons for separating policymaking from policy-enforcing functions, and with the growth of the state these
reasons become more cogent and obvious. In New Mexico this principle is
heavily beclouded in the area of water resources and land use.
II
GROUND

WATER

A. Conditionsand Trends

Since 1955 there have been a number of ground water decisions reported. A
majority of these established significant doctrine and illuminate important areas
of policy. During the period since 1955 the State Engineer, exercising statutory
authority, has extended his administrative jurisdiction by the declaration of
seven new ground water basins and by enlarging the boundaries of several older
basins.91 Controls are now applicable in a total of nineteen ground water basins
90. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-34-1 (1953). The Commission has seven members "and the
seventh member to be the state engineer. . . . The state engineer shall be the secretary
of this commission." In New York the Water Power and Control Commission "may, with
the approval of the conservation commissioner, appoint an executive engineer and a
secretary. . . ." N.Y. Conserv. Law § 397 (emphasis added). In Arizona which also
has an Interstate Stream Commission, the land commissioner, who is the chief
administrative officer in the management of water, is an ex-officio member of the Commission without vote. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-503 (1956). Several western states have
no interstate streams commissions. In Colorado, the governor is empowered to appoint
commissioners "from time to time" to represent the state. They serve at his pleasure.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 148-1-9 (1953). In 1957, Wyoming repealed the 1945 statute designating
the state engineer as commissioner to represent the state. The director of resources is now
designated as the interstate streams commissioner and the governor may appoint assistant
commissioners. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-481 (1957).
91. These Orders, since 1955, signed by the State Engineer, are numbered as follows:
Order No. 51. Extension of Portales Basin
52. Excludes Part of Portales Basin
53. Closing Mimbres Basin (Eastern Extension)
54. Closing Part of Mimbres (Western Extension)
56. Declaration of Playas Basin, Feb. 23, 1956
57. Extension of Animas Basin
58. Extension of Mimbres
60. Declaration of Bluewater Basin, May 21, 1956
65. Declaration of Rio Grande Basin, Nov. 29, 1956
71. Extension of Carlsbad Basin
77. Extension of Roswell Basin
78. Re-open Mimbres (Eastern Extension)
80. Extension of Mimbres

DECEMBER 1962]

NEW MEXICO WATER LAW

of the state.9 2 The large and important Rio Grande Underground Water Basin
was declared on November 29, 1956. Many legal problems in this basin have
3
notyet been resolved.
These recent developments contrast sharply with the earlier period from 1883,
when the Territorial Supreme Court first commented on ground waters,9 4 to
1955 during which time less than a dozen decisions involving ground waters
had been reported. These earlier decisions include one case that was twice appealed 95 and three others which involved no more than peripheral concern with
ground waters.9 6 It is true, of course, that the basic constitutional questions
raised by the ground water legislation of 1927 and 1931 were answered in
Yeo v. Tweedy 9 7 in 1930 and in Bliss v. Dority9 s in 1950. These decisions
along with other earlier cases were discussed by Hutchins in 1955.99
A majority of the recent ground water decisions have highly important implications for emerging ground water doctrine. A third of these decisions deal
with enforcement provisions of legislation, injunctive relief, statutory construction and the exercise of the police power. In general the public control
structure has been clarified as well as strengthened by these decisions. The recent amendment of 1949, 1953, and 1959'0" have also improved the overall
controls which can be traced in chronology if not in legal origins to the artesian
well regulations of 1905 and 1909101 in New Mexico.
81. Declaration of the Gila-San Francisco, Oct. 20, 1960
82. Declaration of San Simon, Oct. 20, 1960
83. Extension of Virden Valley
84. Declaration of Lordsburg Basin, Nov. 18, 1960
85. Declaration of Nutt-Hockett Basin, Aug. 11, 1961
86. Declaration of Jal Basin, Nov. 24, 1961
92. Letter from S. E. Reynolds, State Engineer, to R. E. Clark, Nov. 28, 1960.
93. See Albuquerque case; supra note 11.
94. Keeney v. Carillo, 2 N.M. 480 (1883).
95. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist. v. Peters, 50 N.M. 165, 173 P.2d 490
(1946) ; 52 N.M. 148, 193 P.2d 418 (1948).
96. Keeney v. Carillo, 2 N.M. 480 (1883) ; El Paso & R.I. Ry. v. District Court, 36
N.M. 94, 8 P.2d 1064 (1931) ; Burgett v. Calentine, 56 N.M. 194, 242 P.2d 276 (1952).
97. 34 N.M. 611, 286 Pac. 970 (1930).
98. 35 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007 (1950).
99. Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law. of Water Rights in the West 49-51, published in U.S. Dep't of Agriculture Misc. Pub. No. 418 (1942).
100. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-11-13 to -16 (1953), requiring well drillers to be
licensed; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-11-19 to -22 (1953), declaring underground waters public
and providing for controls over them; N.M. Stat. Ann §§ 75-11-23 to -36 (Supp. 1961),
covering replacement and supplemental wells, and providing for procedural improvements
101. See 36 N.M. Legislative Assembly C.B. 20, Approved Feb. 22, 1905, and N.M.
Laws 1905, ch. 17; N.M. Laws 1909, ch. 64. The Background of these regulations can
be found in Eccles v. Ditto, 23 N.M. 235, 167 Pac. 726, 1918B L.R.A. 126 (1918), where
references are made to the provisions of the Code of 1915.
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The recent New Mexico experience with ground water law amendments
does not represent a unique trend in western water law development. Increased
legislative concern since World War II has resulted in ground water enactments
in a number of western states. 10 2 New Mexico's basic ground water statute
dates from 1927 103 when only one other state in the West had attempted any
comprehensive legislation on the subject. However, New Mexico had enacted
earlier ground water controls and in 1917 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an artesian well control statute passed in 1909.104 The court
found this a proper exercise of the police power:
The lien imposed upon the well and land of the owner who permits
a well to become out of repair and waste water is not upon the theory
of benefit to the owner, but is taxed as the cost and expense of abating
a nuisance and is, we think, fully justified by the authorities. The act
in question declares that an artesian well which is in such condition
that water wastes therefrom is a public nuisance, and authorizes its
summary abatement by the artesian well supervisors in one of two
modes; either by repairing or plugging. The statute declares and

defines a new species of public nuisance not known to the common law
nor declared to be such by any prior statute. Certainly the Legislature
had the power to declare an artesian well used in such manner as to
be a detriment to the public interest and welfare a public nuisance,
although not recognized as such at common law ...

[I]t is plain to be seen that the statute was designed to accomplish a
useful purpose and to promote the interests of the state and advance
the welfare of the people residing in the artesian belt. .... 105
Although New Mexico ranks fourth among the four heavy ground water
producing states' 06 of the West, it remains the only state among the four with
reasonably effective controls. Arizona had no controls over percolating ground
102. See Hutchins, Ground Water Legislation, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 416 (1958) ;

Clark, Ground Water Legislation in the Light of Experience in the Western States, 22
Mont. L. Rev. 42 (1960).
103. N.M. Laws 1927, ch. 182. See Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 Pac. 970 (1929),
holding statute unconstitutional for violation of provision against extension of legislation
by reference. See N.M. Laws 1931, ch. 131, correcting the defect and replacing earlier
statute and upheld in State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority, 35 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007 (1950).
104. Eccles v. Ditto, 23 N.M. 235, 167 Pac. 726 (1917).
105. Eccles q. Ditto, supra note 104, at 244-45, 167 Pac. at 728-29.
106. See McGuinness, Estimated Use of Water 1955, U.S. Geological Survey Circular
No. 398, Figure 1 (1955). In the recent Senate Select Committee study, "ground water
was not treated as a separate element of study." Senate Select Comm. on Nat'l Water
Resources. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Water Supply and Demand (Comm. Print 32, 1960).
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waters until 1948, and has very poor ones now.107 The doctrine of appropriation was and continues to be applied only to subterranean streams.' 0 8 California has recently established token legislative controls' 0 9 and continues to rely
on the judicial doctrine of correlative rights. 10 In Texas there are no statewide
controls."' Controls devised in other western states are aimed at better management, conservation and protection to existing rights. This legislation has
come somewhat late and much of it is too weak to afford investment security
on the scale that will encourage and insure orderly development of ground
water supplies. As everyone knows, population increases in the West and Southwest exceed the rate of growth in the nation. 1 2 It would seem that in some
states the ground water problems have received attention in proportion to population increases and the new suburban, industrial, pollution and recreation considerations that should precede but usually follow population growth. Additional problems involve changing uses and preferences that may be anticipated
on the basis of economic interests. Matters of this nature have been examined
by the Senate Select Committee although not specifically with respect to ground
water. 11 The general case for New Mexico was stated by the State Engineer
in response to the Committee's invitations for a statement of views as follows:
A key factor in New Mexico's water-resources problem is the fact
that agricultural pursuits will provide relatively little opportunity for
increased employment, and progressively larger amounts of the State's
water supply must be put to municipal and industrial uses to meet the
needs of the expanding population. This fact was clearly recognized as
early as 1950. .... 114
In commenting on the rapid development of New Mexico's ground waters
in recent years the State Engineer told the Senate Select Committee that:
107. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§45-301 to -324 (1957). See Mann, Law and Politics of
Ground Water in Arizona, 2 Ariz. L. Rev. 241 (1960).
108. Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservancy Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest Cotton

Co., 39 Ariz. 65,4 P.2d 369 (1931).
109. Cal. Water Code §§ 1005.1, -. 2, 1050-51, 4999, 5001-08.
110. See Hutchins, California Water Law of Water Rights (1956),

published by

State of California.
111. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 7880-3c (1948)

provides for voluntary underground

conservation districts.
112. See Senate Select Comm. on Nat'l Water Resources, 86th

Cong., 2d Sess.,

Population Projections and Economic Assumptions 8, 23-37, 41 (Comm. Print No. 5,
(1960); Senate Select Comm. on Nat'l Water Resources, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Future
Water Requirements for Municipal Use 1 (Comm. Print No. 7, 1960).
113. See note 106 supra.
114. Senate Select Comm. on Nat'l Water Resources, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., VieWs
and Comments of the States 229 (Comm. Print No. 6,1960).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 2

The use of ground water for irrigation in the State of New Mexico
has developed rapidly in the past 20 years. In 1940 an estimated
140,000 acres were irrigated with ground water; in 1950 an estimated
320,000 acres; and in 1955 an estimated 588,000 acres. In 1955 approximately 1,260,000 acre-feet of ground water was pumped for
irrigation and about 105,000 acre-feet was pumped for municipal and
industrial purposes. An additional 13,000 acre-feet was pumped for
rural uses other than irrigation. In 1955, according to Geological Survey estimates, 90 percent of the municipal and industrial requirements
of the State were met with ground water.
The locations of all large supplies of ground water in New Mexico
are generally believed to be known and an increase in ground-water
usage in the next 20 years comparable with that of the last 20 years
cannot be predicted." 5
The State Engineer projected the needs of the Albuquerque metropolitan area
from 195 6 to 1980 as follows:"'
TABLE 4-Projections of population and water requirements of
Albuquerque metropolitan area (Bernalillo County), 1956-80.
Total diversion
Year
1956
1960
1965
1970
1980

Population
220,000
264,000
354,500
463,600
672,200

Million gallons

1,000 acre-

per day
47
58
81
109
168

ft. per yr.
53
65
91
122
188

Other areas of the state are experiencing high rates of urban growth. But the
increased demands for residential, recreational and industrial uses are only one
facet of the development-allocation problem. In some areas of the state agricultural development is predicated on mining techniques; conditions in one
such area have been summarized as follows:
The State Engineer's formula was worked upon a theoretical life of
60 years for the Lea County Basin which would, in reality, mean a
practical life of 40 years based upon present calculations. It is realized
by the administrator that at the end of 40 years there will be a considerable quantity of water which it will be economically unfeasible to
pump for irrigation purposes. It is hoped that this residue will be sufficient for domestic uses for an indefinite period of time. This carries
with it a burden upon the users who will attempt to extract the water
115. Id. at 233.
116. Id. at 244, table 4.
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after 40 years, of paying the additional pumping costs. The local economy will have to pay the price of using the water in just exactly the
same way that any other mining economy must pay the cost.
It is necessary for the public of Lea County to realize that, as in any
mining economy, within a foreseeable future, the product or resource
on which the economy is based will no longer be present. The administrator has the responsibility within the spirit of his delegated powers
to inform the public of this matter." 7
With the physical facts of limited supply, population growth and increasing
demands in mind, the administrative process and the recent actions of the legislature and the courts take on more meaning. For convenience the discussion of
recent legislation precedes an examination of the cases.
B. Recent Legislation

One of the most significant pre-1955 amendments to the ground water statute
requires well drillers to be licensed and bonded."18 This 1949 provision would
seem to be an indispensable element of effective control and is also necessary for
data collection. 119 In 1957, a further amendment exempted driven wells with
a maximum outside diameter not exceeding 2/8 inches. 120 These wells are
typically the shallow household-use type from which large withdrawals cannot
be made. A 1953 amendment declares "all underground waters of the state . . .
to be public"12' and subject to appropriation. The amendment seeks to clear up
the uncertainty that has existed since 1927 as to the public or private status of
ground waters outside the control of the State Engineer's statutory powers. The
early legislation specified classes of public waters to be regulated: "underground
streams, channels, artesian basins, reservoirs, or lakes, having reasonably ascertainable boundaries."' 22 The New Mexico Constitution makes no express reference to ground waters' 23 and contains no all-inclusive language such as is
found, for example, in the Montana Constitution. 124 This was a large part of
117. Harris, Water Allocation under the Appropriation Doctrine in the Lea County
Underground Basin of New Mexico, in The Law of Water Allocation in the Eastern
United States 155, 161 (1958). This book is a collection of papers and proceedings of a

symposium held in Washington, D.C., Oct. 1956, edited by Haber & Bergen.
118. N.M. Laws 1949, ch. 178, §§ 1-6 (N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-11-13 to -18 (1953)).

119. The State Engineer emphasized this in his statement to the Senate Select Committee; see Senate Select Comm., supra note 114, at 237: "Basic data are essential to
orderly programs of water-resource investigation and development."
120. N.M. Laws 1957, ch. 144, § 1, at 217; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-13 (1953).
121. N.M. Laws 1953, ch. 64, § 1, at 108; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-19 (1953).
122. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-1 (1953).
123. N.M. Const. art. 16, §§ 1-3. Section 2 refers to "every natural stream, perrenial
or torrential."
124. Montana Const. art. 3, § 15, speaks of "all water."
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the problem in Yeo v. Tweedy 125 in which the 1927 legislation was viewed favorably even though it was technically defective in extending legislation by reference in violation of the constitution. 126 The court said:
• . . The irrigation code declares public "all natural waters flowing
in streams and water courses," and subjects them to appropriation for
beneficial use. Code 1915, § 5654. The constitutional provision is substantially the same. Article 16, § 2. Appellees argue that the statutory
and constitutional inclusion of this class of waters, as subject to appropriation, amounts to an exclusion of all others. It will be admitted,
however, that both the statute and the Constitution in these affirmative
provisions are merely declaratory of existing law. Under a well known
canon of construction, the rule invoked does not apply: State v. Trujillo, 33 N.M. 370, 266 Pac. 922.
The right claimed (overlying owners to percolating waters) has
never been declared in this jurisdiction by judicial decision. Hence,
it will be found, if at all, in the undeclared law. Ordinarily in such a
case we say that we are controlled by the "common law as recognized
in the United States of America." Code 1915, § 1354. But under that
section we recognize as controlling only so much of the English common law as is applicable to our condition and circumstances ...
So it is not necessarily true that the rules governing the use of percolating waters in England have been, up to 1927, the rules for the use
of artesian waters in New Mexico, any more than it is true that the
taking of water from the Rio Grande is subject to the limitations upon
taking from the Thames ...
Nearly all of the states of the Union in a general way recognize
the common law of England. Yet they have reached different results
as to riparian rights and as to rights in percolating water. . . . As is
well known, a number of Western States have rejected the doctrine
of riparian rights for that of prior appropriation ...
• . . Even among the Western States uniformity is not found, either
in the extent of modification of the common law doctrine of riparian
rights or in the theory upon which modification has been based. New
Mexico, in this respect, long since concurred in the "Colorado doc127
trine," the most far reaching of all.
125. 34- N.M. 611, 286 Pac. 970 (1929).
126. N.M. Const. art 4, § 18: "No law shall be revised or amended, or the provisions
thereof extended by reference to its title only; but each section thereof as revised, amended
or extended shall be set out in full."
127. Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 614, 615, 286 Pac. 970 (1929).
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The 1953 amendment on ground water being public clarifies what may be
inferred from Yeo v. Tweedy12 ' and State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority1 9 and a

logical extension of the "Colorado doctrine" under which surface water rights
were held separate from interests in land. 130 It must be remembered, however,
that the classes of water described in the statute are still the only public waters
that are subject to administrative controls and only after formal declaration of

a basin. The 1953 amendment did not enlarge directly the State Engineer's
jurisdiction. He must first declare a basin "having reasonably ascertainable
boundaries" before he has authority to grant or deny permits to appropriate
although his technical knowledge of conditions within a basin which is physically
related to an area outside of the declared basin may be the basis for action to
limit or prohibit withdrawals. 1 However, the management problems of ground
water in the state remain divided into two categories: those in the declared
basins where administrative procedures apply and those arising in areas beyond
the State Engineer's jurisdiction. In the first category of declared basins, the
statutory methods of appropriation, change in point of diversion, method or place
of use and the transfer of rights are exclusive. 1 2 In other areas, the administrative process does not apply. This situation is fully recognized by the State Engineer in his statement to the Senate Select Committee:
The legislature has declared all of the ground waters of the State
to be public waters, but the State engineer has assumed administrative
control over ground waters only in the areas indicated [on a map showing the declared basins]. A State permit is not required for the drilling
of wells or the appropriation of ground water in other areas of the
1
State. "'
Although no decisions have tested the 1953 amendment, it seems to have removed entirely the lingering hope that the English landowners' rule of unlimited withdrawals might still be revived on the basis of the dicta in Keeney v.
Carillo1 4 decided in 1883 and Vanderwork v. Hewes & Dean"'5 in 1910. The
amendment did not improve management and inventory procedures, however,
128. Yeo v. Tweedy, supra note 127.
129. 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007 (1950).
130. See California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S.

142 (1935).

131. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist. v. Peters, 50 N.M. 165, 173 P.2d 490

(1945) ;52 N.M. 148, 193 P.2d 418 (1948).
132. State ex rel. Reynolds v. King, 63 N.M. 425, 428, 321 P.2d 200, 201 (1958) : "The
waters in controversy being public waters, the statutory manner of acquiring rights
thereto is exclusive. State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007."
133. Senate Select Comm., supra note 114, at 228.
134. 2 N.M. 480 (1883).

135. 15 N.M. 439, 110 Pac. 567 (1910).
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since the State Engineer was not granted jurisdiction over all public ground
waters. But this problem is not as great as it appears since the State Engineer
has brought or is bringing all areas of known deposits 8" within the statutory
control pattern provided by the earlier legislation through the declaration or
extension of basins.
One 1953 amendment, further amended in 1959,3 7 has dubious utility or,
perhaps, validity. It prohibits the pumping or transportation of ground water
outside the State. The 1959 amendment expressly excepts tank truck hauling
in oil and gas exploration. The owner of a well involved in this kind of operation has the duty of ascertaining the use of the water and he must keep records.
This amendment declares that "the amount of water withdrawn from any one
(1) well for such exploration shall never exceed three (3) acre feet." This
provision must mean that the limit is three acre feet in any one year. This conforms with the State Engineer's rule of thumb for allocating water to agricul138
tural uses.
Important 1957 and 1959 amendments relax the forfeiture provision 3 9 by
granting the State Engineer authority to grant extensions of time to One year
and except lands under the Soil Bank Act. It should be noted that the 1957
amendment to the surface water forfeiture statute' 40 does not contain the provision granting the State Engineer authority to extend the time up to one year
for putting water to beneficial uses. The ground water forfeiture statute has
never been precisely construed by the court as applied to non use. In State ex rel.
Erickson v. McLean 141 the court held that continuous non use through waste, for
more than four years was the basis for forfeiting the appropriative right. However, the court laid more stress on the specific artesian well statutes which define
waste 1 42 and provide penalties for violation.' 43 than on the forfeiture statute.
The court did not mention the statute on abandonment of an artesion well for
144
more than four years which makes waste from such a well a public nuisance.
The contention was rejected that the irrigation of native grass and use of the
well for livestock watering were beneficial uses so as to negate the intent element
of abandonment.
136. See Senate Select Comm., supra note 114, at 233: "The locations of all large
supplies of ground water in New Mexico are generally believed to be known and an
increase in ground-water usage in the next 20 years comparable with that of the last
20 years cannot be predicted."
137. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-20 (Supp. 1961).
138. See the Manual of Rules and Regulations Governing the Appropriation and
Use of the Surface Waters of the State of New Mexico, at 19 (rev. Aug. 1953).
139. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-8 (Supp. 1961).
140. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-26 (Supp. 1961).
141. 62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983 (1957).
142. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-12-6 (1953).
143. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-12-12 (1953).
144. N.M. Stat. Ann. 75-12-7 (1953).
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The 1959 amendments generally emphasize emergency situations,'1 45 replacement wells within 100 feet, 14 6 or more than 100 feet, 147 from the original wells,
supplemental wells 148 and save rights in areas where new basins are declared
or old basin boundaries are extended. 1 49 Well owners who have not made beneficial use of the supply were given "ninety [90] days from the date of first
declaration of such basin by the state engineer, or its enlargement . . . or the

effective date of this act, in which to file with the state engineer plans for the
development of such water. ....,1"0 The amendments also require the appli-

cant's plan to state the time for completion of his plans "not to exceed four (4)
years unless the time is extended by the state engineer ...
Another section of the 1959 amendments expands the definition of "person"
1 52
corporations, cities, towns and villages and other legal entities"'
"include
to
that may wish to make applications for water or are included within a ground
water basin. Hearing procedures, objections to applications and the publication
requirements are also covered in another 1959 amendment. 15 3 Denial of a permit on the ground that it "would impair existing water rights" is the same as
provision they found in the older ground water legislation. 54 Priorities are also
established by the new amendments. 155 Appeals from the State Engineer's "decision, act or refusal to act" are provided for "within thirty [30] days after
notice of such decision, act or refusal to act, and unless such appeal is taken
within said time, the action of the state engineer shall be final and conclusive." 156
This language is the same as that found in the surface water statute 57 which
was later incorporated in a short section of the ground water act of 1931.15s
15
This provision of the earlier statute was construed in Plummer v. Johnson 9
which held that the appeal to the district court contemplated by the statute does
not require the granting of the appeal by the district court or by the State Engineer. No formal application or allowance of appeal is necessary. The procedure
required is service on the State Engineer and interested parties with a notice of
appeal within 30 days of the State Engineer's decision. The 1959 ground water
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

N.M. Stat. 4nn. §§ 75-11-23 (3),-24(3),-25 (3) (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-23 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-24 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 75-11-25 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-11-27 to -32 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-27 (Supp. 1961).
Ibid.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-26 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-30 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-7 (1953).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-31 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-33 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-1 (1953).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-10 (1953).
61 N.M. 423, 301 P.2d 529 (1956).
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spells out the procedural requirements and is identical

with the old surface water statute 161 except for the reference to "person" rather
than "applicant," and the amount of the docket fee. This same section contemplates a de novo proceeding in the same manner as the earlier surface water statute. In Spencer v. Bliss, the court expressed a preference for the findings of the
State Engineer in a de novo proceedings by saying:
We are satisfied we need not here decide just what effect the decision
of the State Engineer should be given in the de novo trial provided
for the hearing of an appeal. . . . We think we have demonstrated,
however, it will be an unfortunate day and event when it is established
in New Mexico, that the district courts must take over and substitute
their judgment for that of the skilled and trained hydrologists of the
State Engineer's office in the administration of so complicated a subject
16 2
as the underground waters of this state. '
It would appear from this statement that the hearing before the State Engineer
is much more than a rehearsal in preparation for an appearance in district court.
A recent case, Heine v. Reynolds, 16a seems to do away with de novo in this
context of the statute which says, "evidence taken in hearing before State Engineer may be considered as original evidence." The case held that the State Engineer had not acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in denying an
application to change the location of a well and the place of use of water. His
findings on impairments were supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected the notion that the impairment had to be "substantial." In this case the
question went to problems of salinity. Apparently, the rule is that, without
denying the character of the district court trial as de novo, the court will decline
to overturn the decision of the State Engineer unless it is without support of the
evidence, is contrary to the evidence, or is the result of fraud or misapplication
of the law, as was stated by the Arizona court in Manning v. Perry,164 from
which the court in Heine quoted.
The recent Albuquerque case involved the introduction 9f new evidence in
support of the claim of a pueblo water right, at the hearing before the district
160. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-10 (1953).
161. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-1 (1953).

162. 60 N.M. 16, 28, 287 P.2d 221, 228 (1955). One is reminded of the Wyoming
court's approval in 1900 of the statement in Kinney, § 493: "In the state of Wyoming,
at least, there will no longer be the ludicrous spectacle of learned judges solemnly decreeing the right to from two to ten times the amount of water flowing in a stream, or,
in fact, amounts so great that the channel of the stream could not possibly carry them;
thus practically leaving the questions at stake as unsettled as before." Farm Inv. Co. v.
Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258 (1900).
163. 367 P.2d 708 (N.M. 1962).
164. 48 Ariz. 425, 62 P.2d 693, 695 (1936).
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court. The Supreme Court in reversing the district court noted that "No evidence was offered at the hearing [before the State Engineer] in support of the
claim of the city to the pueblo water right."' 16 5 The district court, upon the
evidence presented in the trial, concluded, in part, the following:
4. That the State Engineer has no jurisdiction to impose upon the
city . . . any requirement of retiring surface water rights . . . because the said City, as successor of the pueblo San Felipe de Albuquerque, has an absolute right ...
11. That the State Engineer has no power to impair or disturb
the ancient water rights of the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico,
which were vested and existed prior to 1907.166
In reversing the district court the Supreme Court stated that:
Proper disposition of this appeal does not require that we attempt
to determine and delineate the exact character or extent of the powers
which are vested in the state engineer, nor the exact character and
extent of a trial "de novo" which is had in the district court on an appeal from an order or decision of the state engineer under the provisions of § 75-6-1 .... 167
The last section of the 1959 amendments is somewhat ambiguous in the use
of the term "domestic wells." The provision reads: "This act shall in no matter
[sic. (manner?)] affect subsequent stock waterings, -stock wells and domestic
wells."' 168 Obviously this section is qualified by the 1957 amendment16 9 exempting driven wells up to 2/8 inches from the licensing provisions. However, a
"domestic well" of larger size and drilled is not per se excepted by the provision
enacted in 1959. This is shown by the conditions stamped on the applications
170
filed with the State Engineer.
The statutes on artesian conservancy districts were amended in 1957,71 to
provide for district enlargement because of the extensions of the boundaries of
an artesian basin by the State Engineer. Upon petition, notice and hearing, the
district court is empowered to include additional lands within the conservancy
district.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Albuquerque case, supra note 11.
Ibid.
Ibid.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-36 (Supp. 1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-13 (Supp. 1961).
See Form WR-15, Application for Permit.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-13-13.1,-13.2 (Supp. 1961).
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C. JudicialDecisionsand Administrative Controls
1. The Police Power and Enforcement Procedures
In State v. Myers172 the 1949 amendments requiring well drillers to be
licensed and bonded were tested in criminal actions. The land owner and the
unlicensed driller were convicted under penal provisions of the new statutes 17
and the cases were consolidated on appeal. The land owner had permitted the
driller to "drill, deepen, repair or clean" and existing well in the recently declared Rio Grande Underground Water Basin.' 7 4 The court concluded that
the new sections of the statutes had been violated. These provisions were found
by the court "to be legitimate exercise of the police power of the State."'17 The
appellant questioned the legality of the State Engineer's order declaring the
basin for the reason that it was, as appellants claimed, "absurd on its face"' 1 76
because "the Rio Grande Valley from the Colorado State Line to the Elephant
Butte Dam is not and cannot be an underground basin" 177 within the meaning
of the statute requiring the designation of "reasonably ascertainable boundaries"178 of a basin. The appellants had introduced no expert testimony but requested the court to employ a theory of judicial notice in order to find that the
declaration of the basin was a "scientific absurdity."' 79 The court rejected
this argument by saying that "...

in view of the state of the record in this

case, we must presume that the action of the state engineer is correct . . .1
and added that "For the purpose of this opinion we recognize that the appellant
Myers may well have a valid existing water right pre-dating the State Constitution." 181 The Court then referred to the specific matter before it:
The cases cited by the appellants do not hold that the State may not
in exercise of its police power require a license of any person drilling
a well in any area determined by the state engineer to be an underground source of the boundaries of which have been determined to be
82
reasonably ascertainable.
The court set out the licensing provisions under which the appellants were
172. 64 N.M. 186, 326 P.2d 1075 (1958).
173. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-11-13 to -18 (Supp. 1961).
174. The basin was declared Nov. 29, 1956, by Order No. 65 of the State Engineer
of New Mexico.
175. State v. Myers, 64 N.M. 186,194, 326 P.2d 1075, 1081 (1958).
176. Id. at 191, 326 P.2d at 1078.
177. Id. at 192, 326 P.2d at 1079.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 191, 326 P.2d at 1078.
Id. at 192, 326 P.2d at 1079.
Ibid.
Id. at 193, 326 P.2d at 108Q
Ibid.
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prosecuted and included the 1957 amendment 1 8 3 which exempts driven wells
the court recognized one
not in excess of 2Y inches in diameter. On8 rehearing
4
point "which we feel requires clarification." '
The court stated that:
The theory on which the case was tried was that deepening a well constituted drilling a well. Nowhere in the court below or in the brief on
the appeal was it argued that the appellants' acts were not with the
statutes. .

.

. Our opinion is to be construed in that light. We are not

deciding that the State Engineer has the authority to require a permit
for the cleaning or repairing of a well as that phase of his authority is
not befort us on this appeal.'" 5
Nowhere in the opinion did the court refer to Eccles v. Ditto' 8 6 which upheld the police power of the state under a 1909 statute which declared waste
from an unrepaired artesian well to be a public nuisance. The discussion of the
nature of the police power in the earlier New Mexico case is as appropriate
and persuasive as the statements from the courts of Washington and Utah found
in the principal case.
Rhodes v. State ex rel. Bliss l'

7

was an injunction violation-contempt pro-

ceeding. The court found that the contempt was civil and held that the State
Engineer had the right to seek an order restraining the defendant from preventing the State Engineer's staff from entering upon his land for the purpose of
making an hydrographic survey. The court affirmed the trial court even though
it was admitted that there may have been harmless error in issuing a restraining
order without reciting the reasons for not requiring security as stated in Rules
65 and 66(a), Rules of Civil Procedure. The court added that these provisions
were unlike any found elsewhere. The court concluded that the order was not
void.
State ex rel. Bliss v. Potter 88 was an action by the State Engineer to enjoin

use of water from the Roswell Basin on two farms east and southeast of Roswell.
The trial court denied the injunction on the ground that defendant had existing
rights. An error in the alleged acreage of one tract was confessed on appeal and
that part of the judgment was reversed. Left for decision was the question of
water rights on two tracts on the farm southeast of Roswell. On one tract the
183. N.M. Laws 1953, ch. 178, § 1, at 144; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-11-13 to -16 (1953).
N.M. Laws 1957, ch. 144, § 1, at 217; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-13 (Supp. 1961).
184. State v. Myers, 64 N.M. 186, 195, 326 P.2d 1075, 1081 (1958).
185. Ibid.
186. 23 N.M. 235, 167 Pac. 726 (1917).
187. 58 N.M. 579, 273 P.2d 852 (1954).
188. 63 N.M. 101, 314 P.2d 390 (1957).
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court found that the evidence supported the existence of a right. On the other
the court held there was no right. The court held that question of the State
Engineer's authority could not be raised on appeal where the trial had proceeded only on a fact issue which, in the case of the second tract, was whether
or not certain acreage had in fact been continuously irrigated. The court said:
The evidence offered by the defendant as to the use of water on Tract
A is vague and unsatisfactory when we weigh it in opposition to two
hydrographic surveys and one aerial photographic survey made in
different years, showing this tract to be unirrigated salt grass land;
and these facts taken in connection with the acquiescence of the former
owners in the permit and license for the new well compel us to hold
the trial court erred in its findings that this tract had a valid water
right.
We have a different situation as to Tract B ...
The court upheld the water right on Tract B and commented:
The aerial photograph is rather dim and unsatisfactory, but it is
clear there were ditches on the exterior from which this tract could
have been irrigated. . . .
We do not want to be understood as disparaging these hydrographic
surveys made by the State Engineer and his staff at a time when there
was no real dispute as to the tracts being irrigated. They were made
by competent engineers on the ground and from the best information
available, and are therefore deserving of serious consideration by fact
89
finders.'
The type of evidence relied upon and the court's explanation of its attitude
toward such evidence emphasizes the need for adequate technical preparation
in water right controversies.
State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood'"0 upheld a contempt conviction arising out

of withdrawals from wells drilled without a permit. The court held that this
was a criminal contempt governed by the criminal law.191 Thus, guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt had to be established. Although the trial court had held the
acts were a civil contempt, the Supreme Court decided that this was harmless
189. Id. at 104, 314 P.2d at 392.
190. 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957).
191. Id. at 159, 315 P.2d at 225: "Tested by the above rules we agree with appellant
that this proceeding was one for criminal contempt, and, therefore, was governed by
rules of criminal law."
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error because guilt beyond a reasonable doubt had been established by substantial
evidence. The defendant contended that the district court had no power to fine
for contempt in amount exceeding $50.00 without a jury trial as provided by
an early territorial statute. The court held that the old statute was invalid as in
conflict with the Organic Act of 1850 and in not setting proper limits to the
court's inherent power to punish for contempts. The decision emphasized the
rules previously considered in Rhodes v. State ex rel. Bliss:192 (1) that the
merits of an injunction are not open to question in a contempt proceeding subsequent to final judgment, (2) the distinction between civil and criminal contempt which is (3) "the purpose for which the power is exercised." 193 In Rhodes
the citizen was held in civil contempt for interfering with the State Engineer's
hydrographic survey. In Greenwood the purpose was punitive rather than merely
to coerce compliance with an order as in Rhodes. The court recognized that "the
1 4
line of demarcation between civil and criminal contempt [is] somewhat hazy."
However, the court accepted the polar concepts of "punitive" versus "remedial"
and held Greenwood guilty of criminal contempt.
95
State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean 1'
is clearly a leading case in New Mexico.

This was an action by the State Engineer to enjoin uncontrolled flow from an
artesian well in the Roswell area. The trial court held for the landowner. The
Supreme Court reversed and held that allowing water to run 24 hours a day
over grazing land without a constricted irrigation system was a non beneficial
use. On that basis the irrigator lost his appropriative right by forfeiture under the
4 year statute. This case is important in defining "waste" in a particular context.
The court said:
[I]t is important to observe that, no mattcx how early a person's
priority of appropriation may be, he is not entitled to receive more
water than is necessary for his actual use. An excessive diversion of
water, through waste, cannot be regarded as a diversion to beneficial
use, within the meaning of the Constitution. Article 16, §§ 1, 2 and
3 and § 75-11-2 of 1953 Compilation. Water, in this state, is too
scarce, and consequently too precious, to admit waste.
The amount of water which has been applied to a beneficial use is,
of course, a measure of the quantity of the appropriation. Waste of
water must not be practiced. Wasteful methods, so common among the
early settlers do not establish a vested right to their continuance. Such
methods were only deemed a privilege, 'permitted merely because it
192.
193.
194.
195.

58 N.M. 579, 273 P.2d 852 (1954).
63 N.M. 156, 158, 315 P.2d 223, 225 (1957).
Ibid.
62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983 (1957).
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could be exercised without substantial injury to any one.' . . . The
use must not only be beneficial to the lands of the appropriator, but
it must also be reasonable in relation.
All water within the state, whether above or beneath the surface
of the ground belongs to the state, which authorizes its use, and there
is no ownership in the corpus of the water but the use thereof may be
acquired and the basis of such acquisition is beneficial use. . . . The
state as owner of water has the right to prescribe haw it may be used.
This the state has done . . . beneficial use is the basis, the measure
and limit to the right to the use of water. The Legislature has also
the power to provide that the right to use of water would be lost and
forfeited by four years of continuous non-beneficial use. Sec. 75-11-8.'
The court quoted from Kinney 19 7 at length on the distinction between forfeiture and abandonment of water rights, pointing out that the element of intent
is necessary in abandonment but unnecessary in a forfeiture situation. The case
holds that continuous non-beneficial use for four years, through waste, results
in forfeiture of an appropriative right.
The principal case was cited in State ex rel. Bliss v. Davis 19 8 where a surface
water right was alleged to have been forfeited. The question was raised as to
estoppel of the state to claim a forfeiture. The court found it unnecessary to
answer the question and said: "Hence, we pass a decision on this matter raised
in the case. Compare, State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 308
P.2d 983." 199
In view of the court's reliance on Kinney which emphasizes that forfeiture
requires some failure on the part of the apppropriator to do some affirmative act,
and because of the specific wording of the New Mexico statutes, 20 0 it seems
clear that the burden of proof in working a forfeiture rests on the state. But in
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Mitchell,201 an adjudication proceeding, the court observed that "The evidence presented (by the irrigator) is sufficient to establish
that the tract did not lie idle for any consecutive four year period."120 2 In State
ex rel. Erickson v. McLean 20 3 the court agreed that estoppel and laches cannot
be invoked against the state. However, the burden of proving the facts of non196. Id. at 270, 271, 308 P.2d at 987.
197. 2 Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights § 1118, at 2020 (2d ed. 1912).
198. 63 N.M. 322, 319 P.2d 207 (1957).

199. Id. at 334, 319 P.2d at 215.
200. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-8 (1953) (ground water statute) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 755-26 (1953) (surface water statute).
201. 66 N.M. 212, 345 P.2d 744 (1959).
202. Id. at 214, 345 P.2d at 745.
203. 62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983 (1957).
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use or non-beneficial use, as was done in McLean, may be difficult where irrigation has been stopped for a period of years and then resumed again. Hydrographic surveys and aerial photos would of course still show evidence of irriga20 4

tion as indicated in State ex rel. Bliss v. Potter.

2. Administrative Process and Ground Waters

As stated at the beginning of this article, there are currently 19 ground water
basins in the state of New Mexico. 205 Physical conditions in all of them obviously are not the same. However, the applicable legislation is general in scope.
Judicial decisions have established additional principles as well are specific rules.
These decisions were reached on the basis of statutory sanctions and policy as
construed, applied or adopted, in several cases, by the State Engineer under his
statutory authority and as applied to the physical conditions of supply and actual
uses in a particular basin. For the purpose of analyzing the decisions the basins
of the state may be divided generally into those which are rechargeable and thus
can be managed on some theory of "safe yield,"' 2 0 6 those that are being
"mined" 207 on a rational basis, and those in which the relationship of surface
and ground water supplied receives special attention. 20 8 The areas outside of
declared basins contain public ground water and are not beyond the State Engineer's technical interest. He must decide initially what area shall become a new
basin, even though the area is not within his statutory jurisdiction until the basin
209
is declared.
The trial courts on the whole have had to look for guidance in their decisions
to the principles announced in decisions which have determined rights and
policy within a few basins.
204. 63 N.M. 101, 314P.2d 390 (1957).

205. See note 92 supra.
206. See Senate Select Comm., supra note 114, at 234, Statement of State Engineer
of New Mexico: "The Roswell artesian basin is susceptible to operation on a continuous
yield basis but the present withdrawal of about 440,000 acre-feet per year amounts to
about 190 percent of the currently estimated safe yield. ... "
207. See Senate Select Comm., supra note 114. "In the declared Animas, Mimbres,
Playas, Portales, Lea County, and Estancia Basins, as well as in other areas of intensive
ground-water irrigation, water is being withdrawn primarily from storage, and water
levels will continue to decline. . . . The policy of the State is, insofar as possible, to
limit withdrawals in these areas to that which can be sustained for a reasonable payout
period, usually about 40 years.
"It is desirable, of course, that the groundwater resources be available to future generations in perpetuity; however, the mining of water can be justified as readily as the
mining of any of our other mineral resources such as uranium, oil, or coal. . ....
208. The State Engineer's Rio Grande Underground Basin Order No. 65 of Nov. 29,
1956, is based on the theory of interrelationship of surface and ground supplies. In the
Roswell and Carlsbad basins the relationship is also recognized.
209. See text at note 133 supra (quote from Senate Select Committee's Comm. Print
No. 6). See also N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-11-1 to -22 (1953).
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CarlsbadBasin

Spencer v. Bliss 210 arose in the Carlsbad Underground Water Basin which
is an area of "continuous yield" and where considerable attention has been paid
to the interrelationship of surface and ground supplies. There was a denial by
the State Engineer of two applications to move ground water rights to a new
location. On appeal to the district court the holding was for the applicant. The
Supreme Court reversed and held that the applicant had not sustained the burden
of proof that the change requested would not impair existing rights. As a result,
the burden of proof rule seems well established. 211 However, the case is important for additional reasons. The expert testimony of the State Engineer,
which is quoted by the court, directs attention to administrative policies. The
court's statements reveal specific attitudes toward the administrative process.
The case involved two applications to change well locations by the same individual. These were treated by the district court as if they had been consolidated.
The applications related to irrigation wells drilled in 1944 and in 1947, both
within the same section and township. The wells had been drilled before declaration of the Carlsbad basin. Declarations of ownerships had been properly filed.
The supply from the wells was used in conjunction with sewage effluent from
the Carlsbad Air Base. The wells supplying the base had also been drilled before
declaration of the basin. When the Air Base was closed the supply of effluent
stopped. At this time, the applicant requested approval from the State Engineer
to move his rights to an area about IY miles away. The opinion of the court
states that existing rights in the "move-to area" would not be materially affected.
However, it was also stated that in the move-to area "there are more wells in
operation than are operating in the area from which the use of water is now
authorized." Water tables in both areas showed "no substantial difference."
The State Engineer had advised the applicant by letter in 1950 that his rights
would be recognized "only so long as, and at times when, sewage was available
for diversion and provided always that the sewage water was used to the extent
of its availability." In substance, the letter stated that the ground water right
"was merely supplemental to the sewage source and would become void when
and if such sewage source was eliminated."
The trial court had reversed the State Engineer's decision. The applications
were granted on the grounds ( 1 ) that they would not impair existing rights, and
(2) that the State Engineer's letter was an improper limitation on the applicant's water rights under New Mexico law. The Supreme Court stated that:
It will not be our purpose . . . to question plaintiff's ownership
210. 60 N.M. 16, 287 P.2d 221 (1955).
211. Id. at 21, 287 P.2d at 224: "We think there can be no doubt that under the
plain language of this statute [75-11-7] the burden of proof in the respect mentioned

rests squarely upon the plaintiff. .

....
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of the water rights claimed. We . . . assume for purpose of our de-

cision his ownership of the water rights claimed. This eliminates . . .
the burden said to rest on him of showing the nature and extent of his
rights. It leaves with him, however, the unsustained burden, if it rests
on him, of establishing that the granting of his application will not
impair other existing rights.
We think there can be no doubt that under the plain language of this
statute (75-11-7)

the burden of proof . . . rests squarely upon the

plaintiff. We are equally satisfied that, as claimed by defendant, the
record is absolutely devoid of proof that existing rights are not, or
will not be, impaired . . . such evidence as there is touching the issue

would seem by implication to support an inference that such rights
212
would be impaired.

The hydraulic engineer for the state testified that in the move-from area
there were "three wells in Mr. Spencer's northeast quarter of section 25 and
lands having-lands totaling about 140 acres. ' 213 In the move-to area the same
witness testified: "I have plotted 11 wells within the one mile radius and then
. . . three more that lie just outside of it . . .- 214 On the water levels the
same expert testified: "[F]or the year 1947, the waterlevel declined about 13
feet in the move-to area. In the year 1948, the decline was about 4 feet. During
1949, it rose something like about five feet. During 1950, it rose about two feet.
215
In the year 1951, it declined about 18 feet."
Later the witness was asked:
Q. Would you say in your opinion that the move-to area is an area
of higher concentration of irrigation as well as toward an area of
greater decline in the water table ?
A. It is certainly toward an area of greater intensification of pumps
and farming equipment and it approaches the heavy declines south
of that area.
Q. Do you know if the State Engineer has ever allowed a move of
this sort toward where there is that much difference in decline
toward a . . . heavier concentrated irrigation?

A. Well, I can't say that he has never. It certainly is against his policy
to.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 21, 287 P.2d at 223, 224.
Id. at 21, 287 P.2d at 224
Id. at 22, 287 P.2d at 224.
Ibid.
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Q. Will you state what his policy is in that regard.1
A. Well, his policy is to not permit moves into more dense areas of

pumping or toward more-toward more dense areas of greater intensity-density, in pumpage or diversion from ground water.216
On cross examination, the same expert testified that the decline in the water
level in the move-to area was due substantially to the pumpage. It was also
admitted by the State's expert that the wells in the move-to area had permits
subsequent in time to the applicants. The implication of the testimony, which
indicated that the State Engineer had allowed people with junior rights to drill
wells in the basin, was overcome by the court's reference to the published notice
of the State Engineer which stated that in the Carlsbad basin appropriation
could be made on lands with existing surface rights.217 The ground-surface
water interrelationship is therefore recognized in the Carlsbad basin.
Lea County Basin

The ramifications of the well spacing policy outlined in Spencer v. Bliss 218
are even more significant in the "mined" ground water areas of the state. The
Lea county basin in Lea, Chaves, and Eddy counties of eastern New Mexico lies
in the High Plains Region. 219 The boundaries of the basin were delineated in
1931 and the basin was closed to appropriation in 1948. In 1951 the boundaries
were extended. The area covers some 2,183 sections and extends about 45 miles
along the Texas state line. In 1955 a study of the basin by Thomas of U.S.G.S.
resulted in the following comment:
Accordingly, the State Engineer extended the boundaries of the
declared basin to include the entire ground water reservoir in the
Ogallala formation in Lea County and set 40 years as a minimum
period for depletion of the reservoir. Applications for new wells are

now approved in townships where existing wells would not unwater
the formation within that period, and encouragement is given to transfer of rights from areas of more concentrated pumpage into those relatively undeveloped townships. Thus the factor of area has become a
criterion in appropriative water rights in Lea County, for new wells
where the wate: could
can be drilled only in the parts of the reservoir
220
not be extracted by wells ander prior permits.
The State Engineer had set up procedures as a result of litigation out of which
216. Id. at 22, 23, 287 P.2d at 224, 225 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 25, 287 P.2d 226 (1955) (emphasis the court's).
218. 60 N.M. 16, 287 P.2d 221 (1955).

219. See Harris, Water Allocation under the Appropriation Doctrine in the Lea
County Underground Basin of New Mexico, in The Law of Water Allocation in the
Eastern United States 155 (1958). See note 117 supra.

220. Thomas, Water Rights in Areas of Ground Water Mining, U.S.G.S. Circular
347, at 12 (1955) (emphasis added).
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grew an extensive investigation of the Lea County basin. The report prepared
had stated that:
Present authorized irrigation plus some of the major non-irrigational uses may be expected to prove about 96,000 acres of equivalent
irrigational right. Assuming a period of 60 years to theoretically dewater the basin and disregarding recharge, it is found that some
218,750 acre feet of water annually is available for appropriation in
22
58 of the 71 townships of the basin. '
In two decisions of the district court in Lea County 222 the administrative
procedures chosen by the State Engineer were approved. These procedures in
223
effect implement the policy outlined by Thomas. In State v. 4lexander
which arose in the basin after the new regulations were imposed, no challenge
was made to the new administrative procedures. The trial court and the Supreme
Court assumed the procedures were correct. The action was for a declaratory
judgment to determine the order of priorities of various applicants. The State
Engineer had made a finding and published an order in 1952 to the effect that
additional water was available in a particular township. Previously, in 1952,
one Collier had filed an application to appropriate 480 acre feet for irrigation.
An applicant named Young also filed a subsequent application. The court said:
Admittedly, prior applications not involved here will, at the consumptive use rate employed by the engineer, so exhaust the available water
that there will remain only enough to grant either the Collier or the
22 4
application of Appellee Young, subsequently filed, but not both.
The court concluded that Collier was entitled to priority and ordered the
trial court to grant the priority. In a discussion of this decision and the general
problems of the Lea County basin it has been stated that "there is no possibility
of granting an appropriated right in perpetuity." 225 Thus, the administrative
procedures designed with the physical contitions in mind, have resulted in a
new dimension to the appropriation doctrine which has been called "allocation" 220 and has been compared with methods for spacing wells in the oil fields.
Additional information and voluminous testimony were elicited regarding the
Lea County basin, and policies of withdrawal in certain areas of the basin, in
221. Yates, Water Supply, Lea County Underground Water Basin, unpublished re-

port of State Engineer, p. 1, quoted in Harris, supra note 219, at 156.

222. Lawrence v. State Engineer, Lea County, Cause No. 9979. Cooper v. State Engin-

eer, Lea County, Cause No. 9565.
223. 59 N.M. 478, 286 P.2d 322 (1955).
224. Id. at 479, 286 P.2d at 323.
225. Harris, supra note 219, at 158.

226. Ibid.
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proceedings before the State Engineer at Lovington in February, 1960.227
Numerous protestants and intervenors were heard, including several municipalities, which were objecting to new appropriations for certain purposes in the
basin. The hearing constituted a full re-examination of the procedures and policies devised on the basis of data available and with the help of technical studies.
These policies were the ones approved by the district court in the Lawrence and
Cooper cases. The administration of this important basin, and others also, is
dependent upon these policies.
PortalesBasin

The Application of Brown, 228 decided in 1958, arose in the Portales Basin
of Roosevelt County. The case previously had gone to the Supreme Court on a
question of appeal procedure that was answered in Plummer v. Johnson.229
Brown originated in the granting of an "emergency permit" by the State Engineer to change the location of a well which in fact had already been drilled in
the new location. The permit was to be withdrawn if there was a protest. A
protest was filed and the State Engineer restrained the use of the well. Thereafter, a hearing was held by the State Engineer on the propriety of the change
and a permit was granted. The protestant then appealed to the district court
and had summary judgment in his favor. Applicants and the State Engineer
appealed. The court held that compliance with the statute after the change in
the location of the well was improper:
It is quite patent that the provisions of [the statute] contemplate
application, notice, hearing and approval prior to change in well loca230
tion. The language can bear no other interpretation.
The court went on to explain that the State Engineer:
• . . needs a reasonable degree of flexibility and opportunity for the

exercise of sound discretion in the performance of his duties. But his
authority is no more than the legislature had granted, either expressly
2 31

or by necessary implication.

The court cited from the State Engineer's own Manual of Regulations 232 and
227. See State Engineer files Application No. L-4174, L-4174X, L-4185, L-4185X
through L-4185X10.

228. 65 N.M. 74, 332 P.2d 475 (1958).
229. 61 N.M. 423, 301 P.2d 529 (1956).

230. Application of Brown, 65 N.M. 74, 77, 332 P.2d 475, 476 (1958) (emphasis the
court's).
231. Id. at 77, 332 P.2d at 477.
232. Rule V, Manual of Rules and Regulations (rev. April, 1951).
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the writings of his attorney 233 to the effect that the legislation clearly foreclosed the granting of any "emergency permit" in advance of the procedures
prescribed by statute. The court then added:
It may be that the State Engineer should have the authority to issue
emergency permits for changes in well locations. But . . . such authority does not exist under the general rule-making power delegated
to grant such authority if it
to him. . . . It is up to the 2legislature
3 4
deems it necessary or desirable.
23 5
In 1959 the Legislature provided necessary and desirable emergency powers.
The Brown case actually decided that the subsequent hearing, at which it was
found that the rights of others would not be impaired, had cured the original
procedural defect. The court went to some length to point out that the opinion
was

.. . in no way to be construed as condoning the practice of drilling a
well at a new location without first obtaining a permit to do so. .... 236
While the opinion did little more than clarify the matters discussed, and remanded with directions to dissolve the troublesome injunction, the statement
about what constitutes an impairment of water rights has implications. In his
motion for rehearing the protestant had stated that the findings of the State
Engineer disclosed that the new well produced a drawdown of 3.9 feet at the
protestant's well which, it was contended, amounted to an impairment. The
court's opinion on the rehearing stated that:
Appellee has apparently misconstrued what he calls the "Rule" as to
impairment. The lowering of a water table in any particular amount
does not necessarily constitute an impairment of water rights of adjoinappropriators. The amount that the water table is lowered is an important factor, but in addition all characteristics of the particular aquifer must be considered along with well locations. Hence we find
nothing in the Hobson decision . . . that is inconsistent with our
23 7
holding in this case.
This statement of the court would seem to lead to the conclusion that on a
retrial of the case the court would require the applicant to sustain the burden
233.
Water,
234.
235.

Harris, New Mexico's Role in the Deqelopment of the Law of Underground
31 Dicta 41 (1954).
Application of Brown, 65 N.M. 74, 78, 332 P. 2d 475,477 (1958).
N.M. Laws 1959, ch. 41, §§ 1-3, at 90-91; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-11-23 to -25

(1953).
236. Application of Brown, 65 N.M. 74, 79, 332 P.2d 475, 478 (1958).
237. Id. at 80, 332 P.2d at 479.
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of proof and persuasion that his new well did not impair existing rights. The
trial court would also have to make a determination as to "whether the findings and order of the State Engineer were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable
238
or not supported by substantial evidence" as suggested in the Brown opinion.
However, the sequel to the decision gives no clear answers. The mandate was
filed Dec. 18, 1958. On Sept. 5, 1959 the State Engineer filed an instrument
entitled "Response," containing his findings which were before the trial court
at the original hearing and in which the State Engineer found that the protestant's well had been in "imminent need of repair and deepening prior to the
emergency drilling of applicant's new well."' 239 The State Engineer had also

found that although the lowering of the level of the protestant's well was significant, it was not of such magnitude as to render the well useless for irrigation purposes. The protestant has taken no further action. This is understandable in view of the language of the court quoted above regarding the need for a
determination of the arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable character of the State
Engineer's order. Further action would obviously be of little help since the
Supreme Court held that the well had been illegally drilled and pumped; that
the State Engineer had no authority to allow such acts; but that the subsequent
hearing had cured any defects of procedure. Thus the decision stands alone and
remains unreconciled with statements in Spencer v. Bliss 240 and Application of
24 1

Hobson.

Roswell Basin

Application of Hobson,242 decided in 1958, involved an application to change
well locations and places of use in the Roswell Artesian Basin. The State Engineed denied the applications and was sustained by the district court. The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that applicant had not shown that the proposed move would not impair existing rights: "Not only is there a failure of
proof in this respect, but the evidence is all the other way. . .

."

The pro-

posed move-to area, about 20 miles away, was in the upper part of the basin.
The movement of the water was from north to south and the upper area could
not be replenished once the waters passed it. The evidence showed a decline
of about 10 feet in the proposed move-to area and a decline of 50 feet in the
move-from area during the period from 1940 to 1955. There was also a greater
concentration of wells in the move-from area. The applicant contended that so
238. Ibid.
239. References to the sequel in this case are contained in correspondence with the
trial judge, Hon. E. T. Hensley, Jr., dated Jan. 21, 1961.
240. 60 N.M. 16, 287 P.2d 221 (1955).
241. 64 N.M. 462, 330 P.2d 547 (1958).
242. Ibid.
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long as no more water was taken in one part of the basin than in the other there
could be no impairment of existing rights. The court replied:
No doubt this position is based on the assumption that the waters of
the basin fluctuate evenly throughout, but such is not the case. On the
facts before us the position is untenable. All parties agree that the
waters of the basin are over-appropriated and have been for many
years; hence, it follows that the further use of waters of the moved-to
area would most certainly impair rights of prior appropriators, par2 43

ticularly those of that area.

This endorsement of an administrative decision emphasizes not only the protection on existing uses but is also a general conservation measure as shown by
the fact that no more water would actually be withdrawn as a result of the
move to a new area. This definition of property rights, within the hydrologic
context, is important. The historic surface water analogy to the rule applied
here is found in the cases which allow a change in the point of diversion along
a stream provided it will not adversely affect existing rights. The courts have

long held that a water right includes the right to change the point of diversion
244
but not to a prior user's detriment.
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Mitchell 245 is of primary interest as an adjudication

proceeding. However, it re-emphasizes the rules laid down in the earlier enforcement and police power decisions. In Mitchell the State Engineer had filed
a petition to adjudicate ground waters and for appointment of a special master.
The master filed his report and made recommendations and the court entered
an order approving the report. The Mitchells then moved to set aside the report.
This motion was granted. Additional evidence was then taken on their alleged
claim to additional water for irrigation of a 40 acre tract. On the basis of the
additional evidence the master found an underground water right. The trial
court upheld the finding and the State Engineer appealed. The Supreme Court
remanded for a specific finding as to which particularwell was used to irrigate
the 40 acre tract. However, the clear conclusion of the court was that if it was
irrigated from the well drilled after 1931, when the basin was closed, there was
no water right. The testimony indicated it was being irrigated from two wells.
The second well that was drilled and approved in 1935, after the basin was
closed in 1931, had a permit conditioned upon use of water on a different tract.
In 1937 a permit to appropriate for use on the 40-acre tract in question was
243. Id. at 463, 464, 330 P.2d at 548, 549.
244. Application of Brown, 65 N.M.

74, 332 P.2d 475

(1958),

citing Lindsey v.

McClure, 136 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1943). See also Public Serv. Co. v. Reynolds, 68 N.M.
54, 358 P.2d 621 (1960) ; Clodfelter v. Reynolds, 68 N.M. 61, 358 P.2d 626 (1961).
245. 66 N.M. 212, 345 P.2d 744 (1959).
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denied. The testimony indicated that the original well on the tract in question
had collapsed. Thereafter, the land was irrigated from the 1935 well. The court
said:
The evidence presented is sufficient to establish that the tract did not
lie idle for any consecutive four-year period. 246
The "crucial question" was:
[W]hether the change in well location from Section 14 to Section
15 was accomplished prior to August 21, 1931, the date the Roswell Artesian Basin was declared. And on this questions the trial court
made no finding. The court simply determined that the well in Section 14 was abandoned sometime after 1927 and the tract in question
was thereafter irrigated from a well located in Section 15.247
After 1931, the court pointed out, a change in well location in a declared
basin could be done only in compliance with the statutes:
To hold that a person having a vested underground water right
prior to the declaration of a basin could, with impunity, forever after
change his well location at will without regard to whether the change
would impair the existing rights of other appropriators would be eminently unreasonable. See Application of Brown. ...
The reasonable limitations on well location changes imposed by
Section 75-11-7, supra, do not have the effect of confiscating vested
rights. The owner of a vested right could, and can, continued to exercise his existing right based upon his previous application of water to
beneficial use. What he could not, and cannot, do is change the location of a well used to irrigate a tract with a vested right without following the statutory procedure. Application of Brown, supra; Spencer
v. Bliss, 60 N.M. 16, 287 P.2d 221.
An unauthorized change in well location is a misdemeanor. ...
*

0

0

Irrigating from an unauthorized well must, insofar as forfeiture is
concerned, be considered tantamount to not irrigating at all. As we
stated in State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 19, 225 P.2d 1007,
1011:
No right to use of water from such sources was obtained by its use
248
by defendants in violation of law, nor can it be.
246. Id. at 214, 345 P.2d at 745.
247. Ibid.
248. Id. at 215, 345 P.2d at 745, 746.
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Mitchell does not involve a change of location of an old well and the drilling
of a new well but rather a change in the point of diversion from an abandoned
well to an existing well. The existing well permit authorized a particular place
of use and did not include the 40 acre tract. Mitchell is an unauthorized place
of use case. No rights to divert water on the 40 acre tract existed. The well from
which the land was being irrigated limited uses to a particular place of use and
did not include the 40 acres. Not raised or answered in the case is the question
of forfeiture of rights in an existing well, or point of diversion, because of
improper use on another tract. In short the rights in the authorized well were
not jeopardized even though it was held that the land on which some of the
water was used had no valid water right.
State v. Fanning249 also arose out of the Roswell adjudication proceeding.
The State Engineer had filed a petition for adjudication in the basin and for an
injunction against illegal uses. The special master found that the irrigator had
a valid water right to 88.7 acres; that the acreage involved had been irrigated
prior to declaration of the basin from a "hand dug well." The master also found
that the shallow well in question had been abandoned and that sometime before
1943 a well was drilled in a new location without a permit. The master's report
was first approved by the district court and then disapproved upon hearing the
State Engineer's objections. The court then enjoined irrigation of the specific
acreage. The special masted had submitted the following conclusions of law:
2. That the shallow well located in the SWY4SWY4 of Section 13,
and used by the defendants to irrigate the lands in question is an illegal
well.
3. That no forfeiture of rights appurtenant to said lands resulted
from the unlawful Change of Point of Diversicn referred to in Conclusion of Law No. 2. 250
Citing the Mitchell case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's reversal of the master's conclusion in No. 3 and held that the unauthorized change
in the location of the well resulted in a forfeiture of any pre-existing water right
which right, the court concluded, could not be revived by irrigation from an
illegal well. The court said:
It is obvious that the special master's conclusion of law number 3,
hereinbefore quoted, is in direct conflict with our holding in State ex
rel. Reynolds v. Mitchell, supra, which case, in fairness to the special
249. 68 N.M. 313,361 P.2d 721 (1961).
250. Id. at 315, 361 P.2d at 722.
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master, was decided
after he had submitted his findings of fact and
25 1
conclusions of law.
Thus the principles of Mitchell and Brown were strongly reaffirmed.
The appellant irrigator had claimed that he had done no improper act himself and that any unlawful diversion from the new well was the act of his
predecessor in interest. In response to this the court stated:
Our answer to this is that appellant had lived near the land involved
for forty-four years. He knew that the well from which he is irrigating
the lands involved was drilled in 1942 or 1943, and he also knew at the
time, or shortly after he purchased the land, that there was a lawsuit
(pending). . .. Also, it is the duty of the owner of a water right to
comply with the law and the forfeiture of the water right occurred
without regard to the intention of appellant or his predecssorsin title.

Appellant's contention is in the nature of an estoppel, which does not
apply to a sovereign state where public waters are involved. State ex
rel. Erickson v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983.252
State v. Mendenhall253 decided in June 1961 applies the relation back doctrine so as to preserve a water right which was initiated before the extension of
the boundaries of the Roswell basin in 1950. Before the basin was extended
the land owner had drilled an inadequate well. At that time the area was outside the State Engineer's administrative control. A subsequent effort produced
a satisfactory well and coincided with the declaration of the new boundaries.
The trial court held that the well owner had not acquired a water right because
the water had not been put to beneficial use at the time of the declaration of the
basin. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the first step in the acquisition of the water right dated from the time the work was commenced on the
first well. The court framed the inquiry in this manner:
Does a landowner who lawfully initiates the development of an underground water right and carries the same to completion with reasonable diligence acquire a water right with a priority date as of the
beginning of his work, notwithstanding the fact that the land involved
were put into a declared artesian basin before work was completed
and the water put to beneficial use on the ground? This is the only
question presented in this appeal.

25 4

After examining the legislation and previous decisions the court concluded:
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 317, 361 P.2d at 723.
Id. at 317, 361 P.2d at 723 (emphasis added).
68 N.M. 467, 362 P.2d 998 (1961).
Id. at 468, 362 P.2d at 999.
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We are convinced that appellants having legally commenced drilling their well on or before May 31, 1949, and having proceeded diligently to develop the water and place it to beneficial use on the 248.49
acres in the crop year 1950, they thereby acquired a good and valid
water right therefor with a priority date of May 31, 1949, as found by
the Special Master, and that the intervening order extending the Ros-

well Artesian Basin on February 6, 1950, in no way affected the legal255
ity or validity of the appropriation.
The facts of this case and other applications before the State Engineer obviously inspired several of the 1959 amendments2 56 to the ground water statutes.
Rio Grande UndergroundBasin

State v. Myers2 57 has already been discussed in connection with the exercise
of the police power in declaring the Rio Grande Basin. The criminal sanctions
of the statutes were invoked and the Supreme Court upheld their application
against the land owner and the well driller on the theory that deepening a well
constituted drilling a well within the meaning of the legislation and therefore
compliance with the statutes was mandatory.
Public Serv. Co. v. Reynolds258 questioned the administrative authority and
discretion of the State Engineer to approve and then limit withdrawals from
supplemental wells serving the city of Santa Fe under an application to change
the point of diversion to a new well. The application was made on the basis of
rights claimed under an Old Declaration of Rights prior to 1907 and declarations between 1946 and 1951, all of which were on file in the State Engineer's
office. Under these declarations a total of 5,040 acre feet per annum was claimed
Under these claims there were six existing wells used as supplemental supply
for the city of Santa Fe. Each declaration stated when the water was to be used:
"As and when needed to supplement the Company's main source of supply for
City of Santa Fe. . .. ,,259 At no time had water in excess of the total claimed
or 5,040 acre feet ever been used. The pumping was coordinated with surface
reservoir storage. The testimony showed that the existing wells had declined
in production and could not meet the demand in the peak, April to October
period, which was estimated to amount to 3,625 acre feet if the annual demand
was 5,040 acre feet. The existing wells produced 1,415 acre feet less than that
demand. The State Engineer approved the application, provided however, that
255. Id. at 475, 362 P.2d at 1004.
256. See specifically N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-11-27 to -36 (Supp. 1961).
257. 64 N.M. 186, 326 P.2d 1075 (1958).

258. Public Serv. Co. v. Reynolds, 68 N.M. 54, 358 P.2d 621 (1960). See also Clodfelter v. Reynolds, 68 N.M. 61, 358 P.2d 626 (1961).

259. Public Serv. Co v. Reynolds, 68 N.M. 54, 56, 358 P.2d 621, 623 (1960).
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(1) the maximum rate of production would not exceed 1,000 g.p.m., and (2)
the total amount appropriated under the declarations and permits (from all
wells including the proposed new one) would not exceed 5,040 acre feet per
annum.
In substance the Public Service Company contended that the State Engineer
had by his imposed conditions tried to adjudicate water rights with no authority
to do so. The court said:
Counsel for appellee concedes that appellee does not have the authority to adjudicate water rights in any proceeding. However, he argues
that when an application to change a point of diversion is filed, the
applicant has the burden of proving the nature and extent of all of its
rights in order that appellee can determine that the change of point of
diversion will not impair existing rights.
We cannot agree. . . . As to the nature of appellant's claimed water
rights, they are a matter of record. . . . As to the extent thereof . . .
under the declarations and by virtue of which appellant drilled its six
wells, appellant frankly states that it does not know what rights, if
any, they have under said six wells and will not know0 until an adjudi26
cation is made by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The court held that this was not an application for a new diversion or appropriation and therefore applicant had no burden of showing that there were
unappropriated waters available. No more than a request for a change in the
point of diversion was involved. The State Engineer had found that the proposed changes would not impair existing rights. The district court's judgment
denying the Public Service Company an appeal from the State Engineer's decision that purported to limit the water rights of Public Service Company from
all sources to 5,040 acre feet, was reversed. In the opinion tthere was a reference
to the companion case on appeal which involved the persons protesting the decisions of the State Engineer granting the Public Service Company application.
This case, Clodfelter v. Reynolds, 261 arose over the same facts. The cases had
been consolidated on appeal for the purpose of filing one transcript and "for the
further purpose of taking further testimony and trial on the medits if that stage
of the proceedings is reached in both cases, and for no other purpose." 26 2 The
appellants protested the granting by the State Engineer of the permit described
in Public Serv. Co. v. Reynolds. They feared impairment of their rights. The
first contention of the protestant-appellants was that the State Engineer had:
260. Id. at 59, 358 P.2d at 625 (emphasis added).
261. 68 N.M. 61,358 P.2d 626 (1961).
262. Id. at 63, 358 P.2d at 627.
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[N]o statutory authority for the granting of an application such as involved in this case . . . apparently on the theory that statutory authority is necessary for a change of the point of diversion from surface
263
waters to undergroundwaters ....
The court quoted the relevant surface and groundwater statutes, 26 4 Application of Brown 265 and Lindsey v. McClure266 to demonstrate that statutory
authority and precedent existed. The court emphasized that the right to change
the point of diversion is an incident of property ownership and existed before
statutes were passed. The only limitation on such a right is that other water
267
rights may not be injured.
Protestants also contended that the Public Service Company did not have a
perfected water right to 5,040 acre feet. However, the court upheld the trial
court's finding based on substantial evidence that such rights existed under an
ancient water right prior to 1907 and under later declarations made pursuant
to law.
As a third contention the appellants said that the Public Service Company had
the burden of proving (1) that there were unappropriated waters available, and
(2) that pumping from the new proposed well would not impair existing rights.
The court answered (1) by pointing out that this was not an application for a
new appropriation, and (2) by recognizing that the burden of proof is on the
applicant and that this burden was met in the hearing before the State Engineer
about whom the court said:
[I]s a highly qualified, able and competent engineer. . . . He heard
the evidence and found that the diversion proposed . . . will not impair . . . rights. . . . The district court also found that no prior
existing rights will be impaired by the pumping of the proposed well.
268
• . . [The] findings are supported by substantial evidence.
In answer to the fourth point raised on appeal which questioned the State
Engineer's authority, the court said there was no merit in it. But the court
quoted the district court's conclusion of law as follows:
It is the function and duty of the State Engineer to regulate and
supervise the appropriation, measurement and distribution of the pub263. Id. at 65, 358 P.2d at 628, 629 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 65, 358 P.2d at 629.
265. 65 N.M. 74, 332 P.2d 475 (1958).
266. 136 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1943.)
267. Id. at 70: "[A]water right is a property right and inherent therein is the right
to change the place of diversion, storage, or use of the water if the rights of other water
users will not be injured thereby."
268. Clodfelter v. Reynolds, 68 N.M. 61, 67, 358 P.2d 626, 630 (1961).
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lic waters of the State and the apportionment thereof in accordance
with the law, so as to prevent waste, prevent the improper location
and drilling of wells and diversion of surface waters, to the end that
said waters be conserved and be put to beneficial use as contemplated
by law, and so as to protect the9 rights therein of appropriators in
20
accordance with their priorities.

The Clodfelter decision affirmed the trial court holding that the Public Service Company application did not attempt a new appropriation and that there
was therefore no burden on the utility to show that unappropriated waters
were available.270 The court upheld the finding that the new diversion would
not impair existing rights. The companion Public Service Company case was reversed only insofar as was necessary to correct the attempt of the State Engi271
neer to limit or adjudicate the utility's water rights.

The recent Albuquerque case 272 arose out of the application of the municipality for permits to appropriate underground waters in the Rio Grande Underground Basin. The State Engineer, after a hearing, denied four applications on the ground that such waters constitute a base flow of the stream and
that all of the flow of the Rio Grande has been fully appropriated. On appeal
to the district court no further evidence was offered on the question of any
unappropriated supply, "but, over the objection of the state engineer, the court
did receive evidence relating to the city's claimed pueblo water right." 278 Thereafter the district court held that the city, under claim of a pueblo water right,
had an "absolute right to appropriate and apply to beneficial use such underground waters of the Rio Grande Underground Water Basin as it may need
from the four wells in question."' 274 On appeal to the Supreme Court the State
Engineer contended "that the powers and duties imposed upon him are administrative in character and that he therefore had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
the claim of the city that it is the owner of a pueblo water right," 2 7 5 and the
district court had no greater jurisdiction on appeal than did the State Engineer.
The Supreme Court held that the State Engineer had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of a pueblo water right; that the findings and conclusions of
the district court relating to a pueblo right included issues not properly before
the court, and that such findings and conclusions should be stricken. The court
returned the case to the district court for further proceedings.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 68, 358 P.2d at 631.
Ibid.
68 N.M. 54, 358 P.2d 621 (1960).
City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, State Engineer, decided December 14, 1962.
See note 11 upra.
273. Ibid.
274. Ibid.
275. Ibid.
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A second part of the decision deals at length with the interrelationship of
surface and ground waters in the basin, the methods and procedures for appropriation and the plan adopted by the State Engineer pursuant to the statutes.
The court concluded that the State Engineer had performed his functions according to law and that he "adopted the only known plan to avoid impairment
to existing rights" 276 and that the plan was within his "lawful power and
authority."
3. Surface-Ground Water Classification: Confusion Over Facts and
Doctrine.
State v. King 277 was a successful action by the State Engineer to enjoin withdrawals from the Roswell shallow ground-water basin. However, the actual
decision of the Supreme Court, which upheld the State Engineer, is tangential
to the central problem of classifying waters as private and public or as surface or
ground water. The irrigator had drilled a well in 1946 without a permit. He
used the waters to replace or supplement waters from Lake Prichard, the landowner's private lake. The lake received waters from the surplus flow of the
Hagerman Irrigation Canal. The irrigator contended that since these waters in
his lake were private they remained private even when they percolated downward and contributed to the Roswell underground shallow basin. Therefore, he
contended, he was entitled to pump the same waters from the shallow groundwater basin, less losses due to evaporation and seepage. In response to this claim
the court said:
The contentions cannot be sustained .. .the waters used by appellant were not being diverted from his lake. As to the latter question
(storage in the shallow basin), it has no legal sanction. We find no law
permitting the storing of private waters in established underground
water basins. When waters, either artificialsurface waters or natural
surface waters, reach an established undergroundbasin by percolation,
seepage or otherwise, they become public waters as defined by 7511-1 .
278

The court also added that:
The waters in controversy being public waters, the statutory manner
of acquiring rights thereto is exclusive. State ex. rel. Bliss v. Dority,
55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007.279
The court dismissed appellant's reliance on an important case as follows:
276. Ibid.
277. 63 N.M. 425, 321 P.2d 200 (1958).
278. Id. at 427, 428, 321 P.2d at 201 (emphasis added).

279. Id. at 428, 321 P.2d at 201 (emphasis added).
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Appellant relies strongly on Hagerman Irr. Co. v. East Grand
Plains Drainage Dist. 25 N.M. 649, 187 P. 555. The case lends no
material 0 assistance. There the court was dealing with surface
28
waters.
This statement is a clue to the uncertain, and perhaps, arbitrary distinction
between surface and ground waters on which the classification of private and
public waters depends in several cases. King held that waters whcih were private
on the surface of the ground, or in a lake, became public Waters when they entered the shallow ground water basin. Two other recent cases involve similar
problems of classification. 28 ' The Hagerman decision cited above is the source
of questionable doctrine in all of these cases.
Hagerman was decided in 1920. The specific holding was that an irrigation
district could not appropriate drainage water in the defendant's drainage ditches
because "artificial water," as then defined, was not subject to appropriation
under the general statute.28 2 The suit had been brought by the irrigation district
to enjoin the drainage district from diverting the drainage water which had
flowed into the irrigation district canal. The drainage district planned to sell
the water to users beyond the canal of the irrigation district. The case had been
tried on the theory of an appropriation of the drainage water by the irrigation
district. A theory of prescriptive rights had been alleged but was later abandoned at the trial. In affirming the trial court the Supreme Court said:
It is conceded by appellant (irrigation district), that if the landowners upon which the artificial flow is developed desire to utilize the
water, as against them it would have no right, but it does not insist
that the drainage ditch, the corporate entity under the statute, has no
power to sell water, and the fact that it desires to carry water beyond
its line for the purpose of selling it to other parties gives it a right to
prevent the carrying of the drainage ditch further. . . . Unless appellant owns the water or a right to the use of the same, as we have
280. Ibid. (Emphasis added).
281. Applications of Langenegger, 64 N.M. 218, 326 P.2d 1098 (1958) ; Templeton
v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 65 N.M. 59, 332 P.2d 465 (1958). See
Federici, Some Legal Aspects Regarding Ground Waters, 1941 Proceedings N.M. State
Bar 66, for a discussion of existing and proposed methods of classification in New
Mexico.
282. Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., 25 N.M. 649,
187 Pac. 555 (1920). The 1915 Code, § 5654 (now N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-1-1 (1953)),
simply specifies what waters are subject to appropriation. Vanderwork v. Hewes & Dean,

15 N.M. 439, 110 Pac. 567 (1910) had held that "seepage" water was not subject to
the State Engineer's jurisdiction and had held that an artesian well was not "constructed
works" within the meaning of the statute (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5712 (1915), as amended,
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 77-525 (1941), now N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-25 (1953)) which gave
to the owner of works the first right to claim "seepage water from constructed works."
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stated, it is not concerned with the disposition which the drainage
commissioners may see fit to make of the same; and, as it has not right
. . . to the use of the water, prior to its discharge into its canal, and
and has no right to a continuation of the discharge, the court properly
2 83
refused to grant the injunction.
The court relied on the doctrine "that the creator of an artificial flow of
water is the owner of the water so long as it is confined to his property. ' 28 4 In
support of this rule, the court cited English cases and American mining cases
from Utah, Nevada and Colorado and also the New Mexico non-mining case
of Vanderwork v. Hewes & Dean.285 The latter case was questioned by
Hutchins because the court categorized the waters as "seepage or percolating
waters from an unknown source. ' 2 8 6 Hutchins commented: Vanderwork "involved water originating from seepage but diffused over the ground, which the
court called seepage or spring water from some unknown source, and which was
treatedin the case as percolating water," i.e., ground water.28 7 Vanderwork emphasizes the artificiality of the ground-surface water classification. The court
said: "The main question for our consideration is, whether or not the water
involved in this controversy is public water," 288 and therefore subject to statutory appropriation procedures. Tle court reached the conclusion that the water
was private water by starting with the premise that it was percolating, i.e.,
ground water. The Supreme Court concluded that "the lower court, correctly
held, that the Territorial Engineer had no jurisdiction over such waters and no
power to grant appellant a permit to appropriate them." 28 9 The courts' classification of the water as "seepage or percolating water from an unknown source"
led to the conclusion that it was part of the landowner's property and therefore private. There was some testimony about its probable origin:
It is true, that one witness was of the opinion that the water came
from a dynamited artesian well, three fourths of a mile away. This, of
course, was only a speculative opinion of the witness. Even if true, it
would be immaterial, as this well would not be constructed works,
within the act. [The statute, 75-5-25, as it was enacted before amendment in 1951].290
283. Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., supra note 282
at 657, 187 Pac. at 558.
284. Id. at 656, 187 Pac. at 558.
285. Id. at 654-56, 187 Pac. at 557, 558.
286. Vanderwork v. Hewes & Dean, 15 N.M. 439,445, 110 Pac. 567, 569 (1910).
287. Hutchins, New Mexico Law of Water Rights 51-52 (1955) (emphasis added).
288. Vanderwork v. Hewes & Dean, 15 N.M. 439, 443, 110 Pac. 567, 568 (1910).
289. Id. at 445-46, 110 Pac. at 569.
290. Id. at 445, 110 Pac. at 569.
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The fact is the water had actually appeared as surface water but was not within
any of the categories named in the statutes and over which the Territorial
Engineer had jurisdiction. The waters were not "natural waters flowing in
streams or water courses" and they were not "artificial surface waters" as defined by statute prior to 1941.291 However, the landowner still had first claim
on such waters since they did not flow in a defined water course and were not
therefore subject to appropriation. Vanderwork could have been decided on
that basis and without first classifying the supply as percolating ground water
which led to the conclusion that the supply was private water. The confusion
generated by Tanderwork was exposed by Hutchins who pointed out that:
[T]he decision . . . apparently leans toward the strict English or
common-law rule of absolute ownership of small flows from unknown
sources, although it indicates a question in the mind of the court as to
whether a surplus over the landowner's needs might be subject to non
statutory appropriation by an outside party. 292
Yeo v. Tweedy2 93 and Bliss v. Dority,2 94 plus the 1953 amendment 2 5 to the
ground water statutes have clarified the doctrine of public ownership of unappropriated ground waters in New Mexico. But the conceptual apparatus left by
the early cases remains.
Vanderwork was decided in 1910. Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. East Grand
Plains Drainage Dist.29 6 was decided in 1920. The later case contains an important summary of the physical conditions at the time in the Roswell area.
These seem to have been overlooked in recent cases. These physical conditions
also draw attention to the unreality of the ground-surface water distinctions.
Hagerman arose out of conditions in the Roswell area, some of them not unlike
the conditions described in Vanderwork, where irrigation uses from artesian
waters greatly increased after passage of the Reclamation Act.2 9 7 The physical
291. Under the pre-1941 statute (the original 1907 law) the State Engineer had
power to grant permits for appropriation of seepage water from "constructed works."
Under the same statute the owner of constructed works was given first right to the use
of the seepage water upon filing an application with the State Engineer within one year
after completion of the works or appearance of the seepage. Thereafter, anyone could
appropriate the seepage water upon application to the State Engineer and upon the paying
of reasonable compensation for storing or carrying the water. The 1941 amendment
(N.M. Star. Ann. § 75-5-25 (1953)) in substance defines seepage waters as any dependent for their continuance upon the acts of man.
292. Hutchins, supra note 287, at 52.
293. 34 N.M. 611, 286 Pac. 970 (1930).
294. 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007 (1950), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 924 (1951).
295. N.M. Laws 1953, ch. 64, § 1, at 108; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-19 (1953).
296. 25 N.M. 649, 187 Pac. 555 (1920).
297. The background of the Roswell basin development is covered in Fiedler, Report

ox Investigations of the Roswell Artesian Basin, Chaves and Eddy Counties, New Mexico,
State Engineer of New Mexico Seventh Biennial Report 21 (1926).
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effects were the raising of the water table in the Valley Fill and the water
logging of valuable lands until drainage became necessary. In Hagerman, the
court reviewed these conditions:
The appellee herein (the drainage district) was organized by the
landowners of the East Grand Plains neighborhood in Chaves county
for the purpose of draining the lands owned by certain individuals
within the limits of the district. The district in question was organized
in 1915, and began the construction of a system of drainage to reclaim
the lands within the limits of the district. The drains were constructed
29s
of tile laid beneath the surface of the earth....
Irrigation and drainage problems are related. The Roswell-Artesia-Carlsbad
area is an example of the many problems involved and the technical success
achieved in meeting them. 299 The Roswell Basin itself is divided and administered as three units: the Artesian Basin, the Shallow Ground Water area of
the Valley Fill, and the surface diversions and returns from the Pecos and its
tributaries. 300 In the early period of the basin the drainage problem was not
apparent. Later, however, the Grand Plains Drainage District was organized
for the purpose of reclaiming lands.80 1 The tile drains were laid below the
surface. Water flowing into the open drains were the subject matter of the litigation in Hagerman. The court found that these waters were private and
therefore not subject to appropriation.
In 1958, in Applications of Langenegger 30 2 the applicant was denied the
right to drill wells in the Shallow Basin to replace a supply formerly taken from
the drainage flow in the Lake Arthur Drainage District which had constructed
drains in 1923. The Supreme Court stated that "The source of the waters as
found by the trial court is the public undergroundwaters." 30 In reviewing physical conditions in the area the court said:
298. Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., 25 N.M. 649,
650, 187 Pac. 555,556 (1920) (emphasis added).
299. See Fiedler, supra note 297; Fielder & Nye, Recommendations For a More Efficient Utilization of the Waters of the Roswell Artesian Basin, Nev Mexico, State
Engineer of New Mexico Ninth Biennial Report 389 (1928-1930).
300. And often administration has not been able, within the framework of the legislation, to interrelate fully the sources of supply. See Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian
Conservancy Dist., 65 N.M. 59, 62, 332 P.2d 465, 466 (1958): "There are two underground bodies of water in this area." See also, Applications of Langenegger, 64 N.M. 218,
219, 326 P.2d 1098, 1099 (1958): "The basin contains two bodies of public underground
water known as artesian and shallow water. . . . The artesian and the shallow underground water are administered as two bodies of water."
301. The East Grand Plains District was organized in 1915. Hagerman Irrigation
Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., 25 N.M. 64-9, 651, 187 Pac. 555, 556 (1920).
302. 64 N.M. 218, 326 P.2d 1098 (1958).
303. Id. at 220, 326 P.2d at 1099 (emphasis added).
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For several years enough water was intercepted by the drainage system to irrigate the entire farm. During this time there was very little
development of the shallow ground water in the basin. But increasingly until 1937, when the basin was closed to new appropriations,
there was a considerable development of such water. Due to this factor
and decreased rainfall, the level of the ground water basin gradually
became lower and lower. In 1947, according to the first recorded measurement, only enough water was carried in the "A" drain to irrigate
122 acres of land. In 1950, there was water only for the irrigation of
50 acres. The flow was even less in 1952, the year that applicant purchased the farm and water right, and at the time application was made
for the drilling of wells the drain had no longer intercepted and di30 4
verted water in usable quantities for the farm.
Prior to this time the applicant's predecessor had been granted a permit by
the State Engineer, under the old statute questioned in Vanderwork, to use all
of the water carried in the "A" drain. The State Engineer denied the applicant's
request to drill wells for the reason that the applicant had not previously been
appropriating public underground waters on the lands. The Supreme Court
summarized the lower court's findings:
[I]t found that it is and has been the practice of the state engineer
to permit shallow underground water appropriators to deepen existing wells or drill additional wells in order to supplement the supply of
water to the existing appropriative right when it is not satisfied by the
original means of diversion. It further found that the customary
method of appropriating the shallow underground waters of the basin
has been by the drilling of vertical pumping wells, while applicant's
appropriation was by a constructed system of ditches; that the ditches
could be deepened to intercept more water, but the expense of such an
operation would be prohibitive, while the drilling of wells for the purpose would be economically feasible. The court also found that if the
wells applied for were drilled, the result would be a lowering of the
water table on the farm and on the land to the west of it, which would
retard the encroachment of salt cedars and other phreatophytes, and
diminish loss of water through evapo-transpiration and reduce the non
05
beneficial consumption of water in the area.
One conclusion of law by the trial court set out in the Supreme Court opinion should be emphasized:
304. Id. at 220, 221, 326 P.2d at 1099.
305. Id. at 221, 326 P.2d at 1100.

DECEMBER 1962]

NEW MEXICO WATER LAW

3. That the waters provided by the "A" drain line were at all times
material hereto private artificial waters and did not constitute a part
06
of the public waters of the state.3
But in its opinion the Supreme Court had already said that "The source of the
waters as found by the trial court is the public underground waters." 10 7 The
court expressly relied on the Hagerman case and held that the applicant had
no appropriative rights:
The rule that these drainage waters are private has become a rule of
property, and it is now too late to change it, even if we were inclined
so to do.
We again hold drainage waters are private and further the use of
the drainage water for irrigation of lands by the applicant and his
predecessors may not be made the basis for a right to appropriate public
308
waters of this state, although the drainage waters are now depleted.
In view of the limited supply available, the allocation problems and the recognition-of priorities and existing uses, the decision is probably correct. However,
the weakness of the ground-surface water classification is made more obvious
by the decision. Langenegger indicates that waters in open drainage ditches are
artificial surface waters and therefore private waters. But the same waters
pumped from shallow wells would be public ground waters. This is the obvious

implication of Hagerman.
When these and other implications are examined against the physical facts in
Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist.309 also decided in 1958,

the confusion grows over what is ground and what is surface water. In Templeton the court allowed a change in the point of diversion from the Rio Felix
to wells. The Rio Felix is an intermittent stream into which waters of the
Valley Fill are discharged. The court described the general conditions as
follows:
The Rio Felix channel passes across this Valley Fill and at places is
as deep as twenty-five feet or more into the Valley Fill. The water
flow of this river, except for flood waters, rises into the channel from
the Valley Fill wherever the waters of the Shallow Basin are higher
than the bed of the river.
It is not a continuous stream except in flood times. The waters that fall
on the headwaters of the stream run for a distance and then they lose
306. Id. at 222, 326 P.2d at 1100 (emphasis added).
307. See text at note 303 supra. (emphasis added).
308. Id. at 222, 326 P.2d at 1101.
309. 65 N.M. 59, 332 P.2d 465 (1958).
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themselves in the ground. In other words, the headwaters of the Rio
Felix sink and become a part of the Valley Fill except for times when
the stream is in flood stage.
The Court further found that the appropriationsof water by the
applicants from the Felix river were in effect appropriationsfrom the
Valley Fill.

Until the year 1952, the flow of the Rio Felix supplied enough water
for the irrigation of the lands involved, but about that time the water
table began to lower materially, and thus decreased the amount of water
[in the Felix]. .

.

. This decrease in the water table was due to the

pumping of water from irrigation wells which have been drilled into
the Shallow Water Basin in later years, aggravated by several years
of drouth [sic].
The water which makes up the Shallow Water Basin comes from
precipitation, leakage from the artesian basin, return water from irrigation, and a small amount of leakage from irrigationcanals.810

The Supreme Court also stated that:
The Court concluded that the water of appellees appropriated from
he natural flow of the Rio Felix included the waters in the Valley Fill
that would have naturally reached the river, except for the acts of subsequent appropriators. The Court further concluded that the restoration to the appellees of the quantity of water originally appropriated
by means of wells sunk into the Valley Fill at the locations designated
by appellees, cannot and does not impair any other water right. 1'
310. Id. at 62, 332 P.2d at 466-67 (emphasis added).
See appeals to the District Court for Bernalillo County, Nos. 18634, 18663-66. These
five cases were consolidated, all involving water rights in the Cottonwood Creek area.
The District Judge, in his Findings and Conclusions, decided that the cases were governed by Templeton:
Finding No. 8. While the Cottonwood Creek, as distinguished from its
neighboring tributary to the north, the Rio Felix, has a much less extensive
drainage and tributary system and in that, in geological times, an upheaval or
uplift cut off its reach into the Sacramento and Guadalupe mountain ranges
to the west with its consequent ability to pick up water from these sources,
nevertheless, in other respects the situations are identical, and the present sources
of water for both the Felix and the Cottonwood are otherwise the same.
The court concluded as a matter of law that all five applicants had vested water rights;
that restoration of original supply by means of wells sunk into the Valley Fill would not
impair existing water rights; that no statutory authority is required for changing the
point of diversion of surface water to a shallow well supplied from the same source

and that "All water, whether 'artificial' or not, that finds its way into the Valley Fill,
designated as the Roswell Shallow Water Basin, is public water and all prior claims to
it are lost." (Conclusion No. 6). The court further held that the water rights of the
Carlsbad Irrigation District were not impaired by the withdrawals of the five applicants.
There is some indication that there will be an appeal in these cases.
311. Id. at 63, 332 P.2d at 467.
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The court went to some length to show that the State Engineer's real claim
was that the applications were in effect requests for new appropriations out of
the underground basin to supplement surface rights; that these applications were
actually a request for a change from a river or surface right to a ground water
right:
The appellants have tried the case and make their contentions on the
theory that the waters of the Rio Felix are surface waters and they are
distinct and separate from the underground waters of the Roswell
Shallow Water Basin referred to as the waters of the Valley Fill. On
the other hand the appellees tried the case and make their contentions
on the theory that the source of their water, except flood water, is the
Valley Fill and that they have the right to pursue it by drilling wells
into the Valley Fill provided it does not impair existing rights
3 12

therein.

The expert testimony clearly indicated that the Rio Felix was supplied,
except during floods, with discharge from the Valley Fill. One witness stated:
In a natural state, the shallow ground water is discharged into the
Felix, as described by prior witnesses, because the Felix is cut down
below the ground water table. When the first shallow wells were

drilled and pumped, the effect of withdrawal of water from the shallow wells was to intercept the ground water that was migrating towards the Felix, so it reduced the discharge into the Felix, but as the
wells were pumped, and the levels of the ground water were lowered,
the water level in the wells got down to where they were below the bed
of the Felix. .3.. 31
On the contention of the District and the State Engineer that the proposed
change in the point of diversion amounted to a new appropriation in a fully appropriated basin the court said:
This proposition is based on the assumption that there is no connection between the surface flow of the Rio Felix and the underground
water basin. . . . The lower court found that the headwaters of the
Rio Felix sank into the ground and became a part of the Valley Fill
and then rose again into the river and that the appropriationsmade by

the appellees amounted to appropriations out of the Valley Fill.

14

The court then made several references to cases which recognize the hydro312. Id. at 64, 332 P.2d at 468.
313. Id. at 65-66, 332 P.2d at 469 (emphasis added).
314. Id. at 67, 332 P.2d at 470 (emphasis added).
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logic cycle and demonstrate the interrelationship of surface and ground water.
This conclusion of the court follows:
Applying the foregoing principles to this case would lead to the conclusion that the appellees are entitled to the waters of the Valley Fill
that flowed into the Rio Felix at the time of their appropriation ...
In other words, their applications do not amount to a request for a new
appropriation in the underground water basin, but merely a request to
follow the source of their originalappropriation.
[Appellees] are not seeking a new appropriation but merely seeking
a change in the point of diversion. Previously the water flowed from
the Valley Fill into the Rio Felix and was then lifted on to the land
by means of dams and pumping plants. The appellees now intend to lift
the water directly out of the Valley Fill, due to the fact that the water
table has been lowered . . . merely a change in the method of extracting the water from the Valley Fill. 15
The court's disposal of the problem of laches raised by the appellants goes to
the same question implicit in Langenegger: Could Langenegger or his predecessor have made timely protest to the issuing of well permits in the shallow ground
water area in which his drainage water was eventually dried up ? In Templeton
the court said the appellees were not now estopped to claim their rights even
though they had not previously protested the drilling of the shallow wells that
were drying up the Felix.
Thus, we see in Templeton that the water in the Valley Fill which in
large measures originates as surface waters, i.e., (using the language of the
court) "the headwaters of the Rio Felix" and then "sank into the ground
and became part of the Valley Fill," became public ground water subject
to appropriation and remained public ground water even though it discharged
into the Rio Felix "because the Felix is cut down below the ground water
table." However, if such water had been carried out of the Valley Fill by
constructed drains the water from the same source would be artificial surface
water and private water and not subject to appropriation as indicated by
Hagerman and Langenegger. There are factual and physical differences in
these cases that distinguish the conclusions of each. However, the fabric of
ground-surface water classifications upon which the court's rationalizations
rest is weak and unreal. The terms public water and private water are obviously used as major or minor premises and thus produce logical conclusions.
The same is true of the classes of surface and ground water. The real inquiry here should be: At what precise point is moisture classified as ground
315. Id. at 68-69, 332 P.2d 471 (emphasis added).
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water and when is it surface water? To ask the question is to expose the
problem in all of these cases. In Hagerman, water flowing through drains
"constructed of tile laid beneath the surface of the earth" and then into open
ditches is not ground water in the Valley Fill, even though it originates there.
It is private artificial surface water. But Valley Fill waters that have the
same origins but discharge as a stream, or into a stream, is public ground
water, i.e., Valley Fill water subject to appropriation. To a geologist or hydrologist this classification must appear arbitrary. By the human eye test,
water from the same source, discernible or not by the same test, is labeled as
two different kinds of water: If it is an intermittent or wasting stream but
below the level of the ground water table it is ground water. If it is water
drained from land in which the water table has very nearly reached the surface
of the earth, and is purposely drained for that reason, it is surface water until it
sinks below the point of visibility as in Langenegger.The depth of the drain or
the stream seems to be the real test. If the water is drained by an open ditch (no
matter how infeasible it may be to dig one deeper as pointed out in Langenegger)
the supply retains the classification of surface water but if wells are used then
it is ground water. Obviously, if the Langenegger situation had developed differently we may have seen water in a ditch deeper than the Rio Felix classed as
surface water while the Rio Felix supply from the same valley fill would be
ground water.

More confusing doctrine should not be generated on an artificial classification
of ground-surface water which is scientifically unsound and in practice hinders
overall management of a limited total supply. The interrelationship of ground
and surface water was recognized long ago in the Roswell area in El Paso &
R. I. Ry. v. District Court.316 In this Bonito Stream ajudication suit the

Roswell Artesian Basin appropriators were held to be proper parties since they
were claiming waters from the same source. The relationship is also recognized
in the Carlsbad BasinY' 7 The Rio Grande Basin declaration 8 18 is also based
on the theory of interrelationship.
Adherence to an unscientific and outmoded method of surface-ground

water classification will not aid in the establishment of sound legal measures for
316. 36 N.M. 94, 8 P.2d 1064 (1932).

317. Harris, Nev Mexico's Role in the Development of the Law of Underground
Water, 31 Dicta 41,46 (1954) :

The State Engineer of New Mexico evidently adopted this theory of correlation
of surface and ground water insofar as the waters of the Carlsbad Underground
Basin are concerned. In that area he has closed the basin to further appropriation
except to owners of water rights to the waters of the Pecos River who may
obtain permits to supplement their surface rights with ground water. The rationale of this procedure is based upon the idea that these waters are part of the
base flow of the Pecos River and that all of the water of the Pecos River has
been appropriated.
318. Order No. 65, State Engineer dated Nov. 29, 1956.
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interrelating an increasingly more valuable water supply. Nor will problems of
water management and economic development be clarified.
III
ADJUDICATION
a
As stated in Public Serv. Co. v.Reynolds,31
decided in 1960, the adjudica-

tion of water rights in New Mexico, i.e., rights vis a vis individuals, is a function of the courts. This has always been the rule.3 20 However, ever since New
Mexico enacted water legislation in 1907 and charged the State Engineer with
administrative responsibility, he has been empowered to make initial determination of rights as against the state, i.e., the public, in applications for unappropriated waters. Nothing in State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Products Co. v. Mechem 3 21 undermines that proposition:

We repeat, the right to determine controversies between individual
litigants stems from Section 1, Article 6 of New Mexico Constitution.
This power rests alone with the courts .... 322
The statutory provision since 1907 has provided for appeals de novo to the
district courts 32 3 and has furnished applicants, protestants and intervenors with
the requirement of judicial due process. While there can be no question about

the actual and final adjudicatory function being one for the courts, it is also clear
that the State Engineer is charged with making the initial and factual determinations upon which, in large part, any adjudication will rest. 32 4 As a practical
319. 68 N.M. 54, 358 P.2d 621 (1960) ; see also Clodfelter v. Reynolds, 68 N.M. 61,
358 P.2d 626 (1960).
320. In Plummer v.Johnson, 61 N.M.423, 427, 301 P.2d 529, 532 (1956), which held
that there had been compliance with the statutory requirements in an appeal from the
decision of the State Engineer to the district court, the Supreme Court stated:
It must be borne in mind that the appeal provided is a creature of the statute
and the word "appeal" does not mean that judicial power has been conferred
on the state engineer or that the appeal is from one judicial tribunal to another.
Quite the contrary; as thus used, it merely denotes the review by a judicial tribunal of the acts of an administrative officer, the state engineer.
321. 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
322. Id. at 254, 316 P.2d at 1072.
323. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-1 (1953).
324. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-2-9 (1953) : "The state engineer shall have the supervision of the apportionment of water in this state according to the licenses issued by him
and his predecessors and the adjudication of the courts." (Emphasis added). See also
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-5-1 to -6 (1953). In a 1909 case in Idaho, Speer v. Stephenson, 16
Idaho 707, 717-18, 102 Pac. 365,369 (1909) the court said:
It will thus be seen that the state engineer is given power and jurisdiction
to determine certain matters before the permit is issued. ...
If, under the Constitution, the Legislature may regulate the manner and
means of appropriating the public waters of the state, and give to the state
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matter this means that a very large number of water "rights" in New Mexico
have been and are being passed on at the administrative level. This administrative decision is normally the only "determination" that is ever made of such
rights. The essence of judicial adjudication in western water rights matters
is the fixing of priorities8 25 and this question is not ordinarily raised until the
supply is no longer adequate to provide for existing uses. The comprehensive
stream system adjudication procedure set up by statute,326 by which priorities
are fixed, may not be invoked for years after the source is threatened by excessive diversions or withdrawals.
The major economic and other community developments turn upon the
initial decisions of the State Engineer. These developments may occur in or be
planned for areas of the state where there never has been a comprehensive
adjudication of water rights, as for example in the Albuquerque area of the
Rio Grande basin. Until recently "rights," i.e., permits, acquired after 1931 in
the Roswell basin were based on administrative determinations only. The
formal adjudication of the basin was commenced a short time ago. In speaking
of the Roswell basin in 1951 and in referring to plans for adjudication, the
State Engineer estimated that 10% of the basin in the years 1947 and 1948
s 27
was irrigated illegally
The holder of a permit from the State Engineer, and persons who have
properly declared old water rights on file, have legal rights8 28 even though
engineer the power and authority to grant permits upon applications being
made in the proper form, we can see no reason why the Legislature may not
also vest the state engineer with power to cancel such permit ...
While it it true the state engineer is called upon to exercise his judgment
and decide whether the holder of a permit has complied with the law, this fact
alone would not make his acts judicial ...
325. See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sharp, 66 N.M. 192, 197, 344 P.2d 943, 945 (1959):
"[N]othing remained for the final decree except to incorporate the same and fix the priority." See also Danielson, Water Administration in Colorado-Higher-orityor Priority?,
30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 293 (1958).
326. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-4-4 to -11 (1953).
327. Bliss, Administration of Ground Water in New Mexico, 43 J. of Am. Water
Works Ass'n 435-40 (June, 1951).
328. In Arizona v. California, now pending before the Supreme Court of the United
States, the State Engineer of New Mexico explained the documents filed in his office as
"licenses," "permits" and "declarations" as follows:
A license is issued by the State Engineer when an application for the right to
appropriate ground waters has been perfected by placing the water to beneficial
use.
The permit is a stage in this perfection of a right. The permit is granted by the
State Engineer after application has been made if, in the State Engineer's
judgment, permission of the appropriation would not impair valid rights,
existing rights. . ..
A declaration is a document filed in accordance with the statutes to make a
matter of record a right that the appropriator may have acquired prior to the
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the quantum and priority of each right may not be determined until an eventual
adjudication. This was pointed out in Public Serv. Co. v. Reynolds which involved ancient surface rights and also recent permits to withdraw ground
waters. In referring to these permits to pump ground water the court said:
We do not pass upon the question of what rights, if any appellant
has under the above mentioned six wells, as that question is not before
us and will have to be passed upon in a proper proceeding before a
2
court of competent jurisdiction.3
The Public Service Company had frankly admitted that it did not know what
its rights were. However, the decision did not turn on Obtaining new rights or
adjudicating old ones. The application was for a change in the point of diversion under whatever total rights the Public Service Company had and the
Supreme Court held that the State Engineer could not limit these rights to
5040 acre feet annually as he proposed:
Appellant . . . contends that no issue was tendered as to what
rights, if any, appellant has in the six . . . wells, and that when ap-

pellee limited appellant's application to 5,040 acre feet per year the
appellee, in effect, adjudicated appellant's water rights.
Counsel for appellee concedes that appellee does not have the authority to adjudicate water rights in any proceeding. However he
argues that when an application to change a point of diversion is filed,
the applicant has the burden of proving the nature and extent of all
of its rights in order that appellee can determine that the change of
point of diversion will not impair existing water rights.
We cannot agree with appellee's contentions. As to the nature of
appellant's claimed water rights, they are a matter of record in appelle's office. As to the extent thereof, and particularly as to appellant's water rights, if any, under the declarations and by virtue of
which appellant drilled its six wells, appellant frankly states that it
does not know what rights, if any, they have under said six wells and
will not know until an adjudication is made by a court of competent
jurisdiction. 30
time that the State Engineer assumed jurisdiction of the ground waters in the
area in which the appropriation is made. [New Mexico's comments on the
Special Master's Report of May 5, 1960, page 2 and quoted from Tr., page 17,

738.]
329. Public Serv. Co. v. Reynolds, 68 N.M. 54, 61, 358 P.2d 621, 626 (1960) (emphasis added). See also Clodfelter v. Reynolds, 68 N.M. 61, 358 P.2d 626 (1960).
330. Public Serv. Co. v. Reynolds, supra note 329, at 63, 358 P.2d at 624-25.
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Since 1907 the statute has provided that determinations by the State Engineer
on applications filed become "final and conclusive '' 3 3 1 if not appealed to the
district court within 30 days. This surface water statute was incorporated into
the early ground water legislation: "The decision of the State Engineer shall
be final in all cases unless appeal be taken to the district court within thirty [30]
days after his decision as provided by . . . [75-6-1]."332 In 1959 the provisions of the old surface water statute were enacted as Section' 75-11-33 and
include the same language on "decision, act or refusal to act" as appears in the
old 1907 statute.

3

3

The procedures for reaching the final stage of adjudication, i.e., the judicial
proceeding, are specified in the statutes. 3 4 There may also be appeals over specific
water rights to the district court, and then ultimately to the Supreme Court.3
In other situations there may be a stream system adjudication as provided by
statute. 336 The latter procedures under the old surface water statutes were recently upheld in the Roswell ground water adjudication in State ex rel. Reynolds
v. Sharp.3 3 7 The applicability of the surface water statutes was the principal
challenge to the court's jurisdiction. The court held that the old 1907 statutes
applied and relied on El Paso & R. I. Ry. v. District Court,33 8 stating that:
In Re El Paso R. I. Ry. Co. v. District Court of Fifth Judicial District, supra, this Court clearly held that all rights in the system, both
underground and surface, were within the contemplation
of the stat339
ute, and from this holding we are not prepared to depart.
The court also quoted from El Paso to the effect that the statute was " 'all
embracing and includes claimed rights of appropriators from [an] artesian
basin' within a stream system." 3 40 No mention was made of the comment in
State ex. rel. Bliss v. Dority,341 where the court said: "We will assume for the
purposes of this case that the 1907 water code . . . has no application to under331. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-1 (1953).

332. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-10 (1953).
333. Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-33 (Supp. 1961), 'with N.M. Stat. Ann. § 756-1 (1953).

334. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-4-4 to -8 (1953).
335. This was the situation, for example, in Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co., 66 N.M.
64, 343 P.2d 654 (1959), and this is also involved in State ex rel. Reynolds v. W. S.
Ranch Co., 69 N.M. 169, 364 P.2d 1036 (1961).
336. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-4-4 to -11 (1953). See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sharp, 66
N.M. 192, 344 P.2d 943 (1959).
337. 66 N.M. 192, 344 P.2d 943 (1959).
338. 36 N.M. 94,8 P.2d 1064 (1932).

339. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sharp, 66 N.M. 192, 195, 344 P.2d 943, 944 (1959).
340. Id. at 194, 344 P.2d at 944.
341. 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007 (1950).
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ground waters, but see El Paso R. I. Ry. Co., 36 N.M. 94, 8 P.2d 1064."a42
The doubts still apparent when Bliss v. Dority was decided have been removed
by Sharp. The appellants in Sharp contended that the old stream system adjudication sections applied only to surface waters "and to hold otherwise is judicial
legislation." 3 43 The court found a "sufficient answer" by quoting the above
from the El Paso case.
In Sharp, it was also contended that the piecemeal approach "township by
township, as hydrographic surveys are completed, and adding parties as their
identity becomes known is such a departure from the statutory procedure as to
be jurisdictional." 3 44 The court explained that in El Paso the question of the
rights of "unknown owners" and "unknown claimants of interests" were examined.3 45 In the El Paso case the court concluded that the statutory procedure
could not be defeated by a failure to serve, or even implead, all parties. The
implication clearly was that parties not served or impleaded would not be bound
by the decree. In Sharp the court's conclusion was:
That the term "stream system" as used in the statute does not necessarily require the inclusion of every possible right both underground
and surface must also have been recognized in that case [El Paso] as
the Rio Bonito is a small stream tributary to the large stream system
of the Pecos River. It was never considered or asserted that all claimants in the entire Pecos River System had been made parties. .... 346

The last statement was made in response to the contention that the water
rights in the same area of the Pecos River had been previously adjudicated in
United States v. Hope Community Ditch.3 47 The court also quoted from

Bounds v. Carner348 which had considered the implications of the Hope decree
and had concluded that:
[T]he fact that all of the persons entitled to the use of the water
from the Pecos River Stream System were not made parties to the Federal suit does not invalidate the decree. It is binding on all who were
3 49
parties.
342. Id. at 18, 225 P.2d at 1011 (emphasis added).
343. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sharp, 66 N.M. 192, 194, 344 P.2d 943,944 (1959).
344. Id. at 194, 344 P.2d at 944.

345. Id. at 197, 344 P.2d at 946.
346. Id. at 196, 344 P.2d at 945 (emphasis added).
347. United States v. Hope Community Ditch, Equity No. 712, United States District

Court for New Mexico, 1933.
348. 53 N.M. 234, 205 P.2d 216 (1949).
349. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sharp, 66 N.M. 192, 196, 344 P.2d 943, 945 (1959).

DECEMBER 1962]

NEW MEXICO WATER LAW

The court in Sharp admitted that no decree could be entered in compliance
with the "priority, purpose, periods and place of use" provisions of the statute
until:
.. .hydrographic surveys have been completed and all parties impleaded, at which time it is contemplated a further hearing to determine the relative rights of the parties, one toward the other, will be
held. We cannot say that when this is done, and a decree entered pursuant to [75-4-8] .. .all of the statutory requirements will not have
been met.350
This conclusion raised the obvious question of whether this appeal was from
a final order. The court said:
that insofar as it covers the matters included therein, namely, the
amount, purpose, periods of use and specific tract of land to which it is
for
the final decree
appurtenant, it was final and nothing remained 35
1
except to incorporate the same and fix the priority.

The priority and quantum of the water right are of course the main private
property interests. These are subject to minimum administrative judgment
although discovering the "purpose, periods and place of use" of the supply are
within the State Engineer's ministerial chores.
On the merits in Sharp the court upheld the findings with respect to the acreage involved. Reliance was placed on the substantial evidence rule, but the
court also added an evaluation of its own: ".

.

. if we add our own appraisal

of said evidence, we can say it clearly preponderates in favor of the findings as
made by the court."

35 2

State ex rel. Reynolds v. Massey353 raised the same jurisdictional questions

disposed of in Sharp. In Massey the court also upheld the acreage findings of
the lower court on the basis of the substantial evidence rule.
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Mitchell 5 4 arose in the same Roswell Basin adjudi-

cation suit. The implications of the decision with respect to illegal irrigation
have been discussed.3 55 However, Mitchell also exemplifies the flexibility permitted in adjudication procedures. The water right claimant had objected to
the master's report and recommendations in an early stage of the adjudication.
350. Id. at 196, 344 P.2d at 945.

351. Id. at 196-97, 344 P.2d at 945 (emphasis added).
352. Id. at 198, 344 P.2d at 947.
353. 66 N.M. 199, 344 P.2d 947 (1959).
354. 66 N.M. 212, 345 P.2d 744 (1959).

355. See text at notes 245-48 supra.
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These had been approved by the district court. A motion to set aside the report
was heard, and the report was set aside so additional evidence could be taken.
The special master thereafter recognized in the claimant an additional water
right which became the subject matter of the appeal. The trial court made no
finding as to which particular well irrigated the land in question, a well in
existence before 1931 when the basin was closed, or a well from which irrigation was authorized on another tract. The Supreme Court remanded for a
factual determination as to the particular well. This case demonstrates the effective controls found in the administrative process to assure proper use on specified land rather than the existence of a water right in gross. This comports with
the general policy in New Mexico of making a water right appurtenant to land
from which it may be severed with the consent of the land owner 356 and through
the prescribed statutory procedures.
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Fanning 57 reaffirmed the principles of the Mitchell
and Brown casesA581 The case also arose in the Roswell basin adjudication and
resulted in an injunction against irrigation uses on 88.7 acres of land. The court
held that a change from a "hand dug" well and a new well drilled without a
permit resulted in a forfeiture of water-rights and that a subsequent purchaser
of the land who lived nearby and knew the facts was bound by the consequences
of the prior illegal uses.
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Mendenhall35 " settled the question of the effect of
the 1950 extension of the Roswell basin on inchoate water rights. The lower
court had held that since no water was put to beneficial use at the time the
boundaries were extended, the claimant had no water rights. The Supreme
Court reversed and applied the doctrine of relation back so as to date the water
right from the time work was commenced to bring in a well. The court said:
We are convinced that appellants having legally commenced drilling
their well on or before May 31, 1949, and having proceeded diligently
to develop the water and place it to beneficial use on the 248.49 acres
in the crop year 1950, they thereby acquired a good and valid water
right therefor with a priority date of May 31, 1949, as found by the
Special Master, and that the intervening order extending the Roswell
Artesian Basin on Feb. 6,1950, in no way affected the legality or va360
lidity of the appropriation.
On May 10, 1961, the court handed down an important decision in State
356. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-22 (1953).
357.
358.
359.
360.

68 N.M. 313,361P.2d 721 (1961).
See text at notes 245, 354, 228 supra.
68 N.M. 467, 362 P.2d 998 (1961).
Id. at 475, 362 P.2d at 1004.
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ex rel. Reynolds v. W. S. Ranch Co.3 6 1 The case arose out of an attempt by
the State Engineer to have the defendant company enjoined from diverting
surface flows above Costilla Reservoir. The district court dismissed for lack of
indispensable parties, i.e., the other water users on the stream system. The Supreme Court affirmed with leave to reinstate the action when the water users
below the reservoir were made parties. The court said that it would:
. . . not construe the statute [75-2-9] to authorize the state engineer
either in the exercise of the state's police power, or as a representative
of other water users, to seek an adjudication of other water rights of
one making a bona fide claim thereto which would affect the rights of
others, without the joinder of those persons whose rights may be
8 02

affected.

In addition to raising questions about fundamental distinctions between adjudication363 and an injunction proceeding and between necessary and indispensable parties, 36 4 the case casts doubt on the pragmatic, piecemeal adjudication
procedure approved in ground water matters in State ex rel. Reynolds v.
Sharp.365 It would seem that the court's previous conclusion in Pecos Valley
Artesian Conservancy Dist. v. Peters,366 that an injunction proceeding is not
an adjudication, is no longer clear.
IV
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND

APPEALS

The surface and ground water statutes provide for appeals to the district
court within 30 days from the "decision, act or refusal to act ' 3 67 of the State
Engineer. The statutes also provide for an appeal within 60 days to the Supreme
Court "governed in all respects as now provided by law relating to appeals
taken from final judgments of the district courts""36 and the Supreme Court
Rules3 6 9 [Section 21-2-1].
Several recent decisions involved appeals from the State Engineer to the district court. The statute provides that such appeals:
361. 69 N.M. 169, 364 P.2d 1036 (1961).

362. Id. at 173, 364 P.2d at 1038-39 (emphasis added).
363. See Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist. v. Peters, 50 N.M. 165, 173 P.2d
490 (1946), 52 N.M. 148, 193 P.2d 418 (1948).
364. State ex rel. Reynolds v. W. S. Ranch Co., 69 N.M. 169, 176, 364 P.2d 1036,
1041 (1961). The court refers to "necessary and indispensable parties to this action."
(emphasis added).
365. 66 N.M. 192, 344P.2d 943 (1959).
366. 50 N.M. 165, 173 P.2d 490 (1946) ; 52 N.M. 148, 193 P.2d 418 (1948).
367. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-1 (1953) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-33 (Supp. 1961).
368. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-3 (1953) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-35 (Supp. 1961).
369. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-1 (1953).
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[S]hall be de novo, except evidence taken in hearing before the
state engineer may be considered as original evidence, subject to legal
objection the same as if said evidence was originally offered in such
district court, and the court shall allow all amendments which may be
necessary in furtherance of justice, and may submist any question of
fact arising therein to a jury, or to one [1] or more referees at its
370
discretion.
The 1959 amendment 371 to the ground water statute made the provisions of
the surface and ground water sections dealing with appeals from the State Engineer almost identical. The 1959 amendment appears to have superseded the
old ground water section 372 on that subject without having repealed it.
Before an appeal may be taken from the "decision, act or refusal to act" of
the State Engineer, his action must be "final" in the sense of having notified
the applicant of a final disposition of the matter. State ex rel. Bliss v. Alexander 37 3 held that a letter from the State Engineer informing the applicant of
any intention to deny said application and which stated that the applicant could
present his position before the State Engineer took final action, did not meet
the test of finality. The court said:
[T]he letter, does it have the finality as to put Collier on notice
that an appeal was available to him; we think not. There was no denial
of the application. The letter was simply a form letter sent by the
engineer to all applicants for permits filed after the basin was closed.
374

Plummer v. Johnson 375 held that taking an appeal from the State Engineer
did not require the filing of a formal application for such appeal. Nor is allowance by the State Engineer of the district court of such appeal necessary. All
that is required is the service of the notice of the appeal on the State Engineer
and interested parties within 30 days after his decision and the making of proof
of service in the district court within 30 days of completed service and payment
of the docket fee. Apparently the statutory requirement 76 is satisfied if the
service is on the State Engineer via the district court, or by filing the notice in
his office which was done in an early surface water case.877 This conclusion
370. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-1 (1953) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-33 (Supp. 1961).
371. N.M. Laws 1959, ch. 251, § 8. Cf. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-1 (1953) ; N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 75-11-33 (Supp. 1961).
372. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-10 (1953) (refers to § 75-6-1).
373. 59 N.M. 478, 286 P.2d 322 (1955).
374. Id. at 480, 286 P.2d at 324.
375. 61 N.M. 423, 301 P.2d 529 (1956).
376. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-6-1, 75-11-10 (1953).
377. Orosco v. Gonzales, 19 N.M. 130, 141 Pac. 617 (1914).
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seems to conflict with an interpretation of a similar statute 378 about which
the court in 1920 said: 379 "[I]t was the intention of the Legislature to require
notice of the appeal to be given within 30 days from the decision." However,
Plummer has settled the matter.
Once the appeal is taken the nature of the de novo proceeding in the district
court and the effect to be given the previous decision of the State Engineer are
the important questions. The answers are not entirely clear. A literal reading
of the statute indicates that a complete and new hearing is contemplated. An
early water case 38 0 decided under the original statute of 1907 indicates that this
is the proper view. Until 1923 when the Board of Water Commissioners was
abolished 3 81 an appeal would lie from the Board and Engineer to the district
court and evidence taken in the original hearing could be considered as original
evidence. When the board was abolished the statute was changed to its present
form. In a case decided under the old statute the court said:
Section 66 provides for certifying to the District Court, in causes appealed, the record of all proceedings in the matter by the Board of
Water Commissioners, and also provides for a hearing de novo in the
District Court, 'except that evidence which may have been taken in
the hearing before the Territorial Engineer and said board and transcribed, may be considered as original evidence in the District Court.'
The act in question, as shown by the above excerpts, clearly shows
that in each instance, where a hearing is provided for, or required, the
same shall be de novo, or an original hearing, where the engineer,
Board of Water Commissioners or the court hears such competent
proof as may be offered by the parties interested in the proceeding and
forms his or its own independent judgment relative to the issues involved. The Board of Water Commissioners does not, nor is it called
upon, to review the discretion of the engineer. Upon appeal to it, it
determines for itself, the question as to whether the application should
be approved or rejected. It is not bound, controlled or necessarily influenced, in any way, by the action of the engineer. It hears, or may
hear, additional evidence, and upon the record and such evidence as is
properly before it, it decides the question presented. Likewise in the
District Court, the hearing is de novo. The court may consider such
evidence as has been introduced before the board and engineer, and
transcribed and filed with it, but it also hears additional evidence, and
is not called upon to determine whether the engineer or the Board of
Water Commissioners erred in the action taken and order entered,
378.
379.
380.
(1913).
381.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5721 (1915).
Valencia Water Co. v. Neilson, 27 N.M. 29, 32, 192 Pac. 510, 511 (1920).
See Farmer's Dev. Co. v. Rayado Land Irrigation Co., 18 N.M. 1, 133 Pac. 104
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-2-11 (1953).
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but must form its own conclusion and enter such judgment, as the
proof warrants and the law requires. It does not review the discretion
of the engineer or the board, but determines, as in this case it was required by the issue presented, whether appellee's application to appropriate water should be granted. The court, in order to form a conclusion upon the issues, was necessarily required to determine, for itself,
whether there was unappropriated water available; whether the approval of the application would be contrary to the public interest, and
all other questions which the engineer was required, in the first in82
stance, to determine ....
Another example of the same interpretation of de novo is found in Young &
38 3
Norton v. Hinderlider,
a still earlier case, where the Supreme Court of the
Territory took a broad view of the administrative process. The court found the
Territorial Engineer's authority and judgment were adequate to sustain his conclusions even though a de novo hearing before the Board of Water Commissioners had overturned his earlier decision. In the Rayado case, quoted above,
the court examined the statute only and raised no constitutional issues. However, many years later in examining a statute which provided for a trial de novo
on appeal from the decision of the chief of the liquor division, the court referred
specifically to the separation of powers doctrine. The court asserted that in
order for the statute to be constitutional under the separation of powers theory
the appeals were limited to questions of whether the actions of the administrator
were unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and not supported by evidence 8 4 An inference from this would be that de novo meant a new trial that
could reverse the administrative decision only if the administrator's decision
was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. No mention was made of the
Rayado case. In the recent Brown case38 5 the court on rehearing commented:
This argument [that the order disclosed an impairment of the protestant's rights] is premature in this Court inasmuch as the trial court
has not yet determined whether the findings and order of the State
Engineer were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or not supported
86
by substantialevidence....

However, the State Engineer's findings did show that a drawdown of 3.9 feet
existed at protestant's well after the applicant drilled and pumped his well. Yet
382. Farmer's Dev. Co. v. Rayado Land Irrigation Co., 18 N.M. 1, 9-10, 133 Pac. 104,
106 (1913).
383. 15 N.M. 666, 110 Pac. 1045 (1910).

384. Yarbrough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91, 214 P.2d 769 (1950).
385. Application of Brown, 65 N.M. 74, 332 P.2d 475 (1958).
386. Id. at 80, 332 P.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
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the court sustained the State Engineer's finding that the drawdown did not
reveal an impairment of protestant's well.
One New Mexico attorney expresses the view that the actions of the State
Engineer are not reversible unless they are unlawful, unreasonable and arbitrary and not supported by the evidence.38 7 This conclusion is in accord with
general administrative law principles and with the views expressed in other New
Mexico decisions. The method often used by state courts which limits review
in the face of an explicit de novo statutory provision, avoids constitutional attacks upon the statute under the separation of powers theory. 88 An observation
by the court in Plummer v. Johnson also supports the view expressed above:
[T]he appeal provided is a creature of the statute and the word
'appeal' does not mean that judicial power has been conferred on the
state engineer or that the appeal is from one judicial tribunal to another. Quite the contrary; as thus used, it merely denotes the review
by a judicial tribunal of the acts of an administrative officer, the state
engineer.38 9
Spencer v. Bliss,390 decided in 1955, contains the most relevant statement on
de novo appeals in water cases. The court considered the Rayado and Yarbrough
decisions saying:
Apparently, the decision in the Rayado Land and Irrigation case went
unnoticed when we were considering Yarbrough v. Montoya. To say
the least, it was not cited. And there was even a hint in the latter case
that to hold otherwise than we did on the question at issue would
subject the statute involved to serious question of its constitutionality.
However, without appraising Yarbrough v. Montoya, supra, as a
modification of our decision in the Rayado case, as it may well be
deemed, we can see room within the full scope of the holding in the
latter case . . . for the district court to give weight to a merited find891
ing of the State Engineer.

While the holding in Spencer was limited to the conclusion that the applicant
had not sustained the burden of showing that existing water rights would not
be impaired, the dicta are compelling. These statements may indicate that the
de novo review contemplated by the statute is not unlimitd. Although the court
was aware of the importance of the question of the effect to be given the decision
387. Harris, New Mexico's Role in the Development of the Law of Underground
Water, 31 Dicta 41 (1954).
388.
389.
390.
391.

See Davis, Administrative Law § 29.11 (1959).
61 N.M. 423,427,301 P.2d 529, 532 (1956).
60 N.M. 16, 287 P.2d 221 (1955).
Id. at 27-28, 287 P.2d at 228 (emphasis added).
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of the State Engineer in a de novo proceeding, no direct answer was given. But
the dicta are significant on the questions of the type and effect of the de novo
hearing and also with respect to administrative policy:
The administration of the public waters of the state, especially the
underground waters is a task requiring expert scientific knowledge of
hydrology of the highest order. The administration of surface waters
alone, where the trained and experienced engineer may see and observe what he does, or should do, and what the agency he administers
is doing, is beset by difficulties enough. But when the administration
is turned to underground waters the engineer's troubles are multiplied a hundredfold.
.

.

.

We think we have demonstrated, however, it will be an unfortunate
day and event when it is established in New Mexico that the district
courts must take over and substitute their judgment for that of the
skilled and trained hydrologists of the State Engineer's office in the
administration of so complicated a subject as the underground waters
of this state.39 2
One might infer from these statements that the district courts may properly
"give weight to a merited finding of the State Engineer." This conclusion is
borne out by the decision in Heine v. Reynolds3 93 where it appears that a de novo
proceeding as outlined by the statute is greatly modified if not abolished.
In 1960 in Pettet v. Reynolds3 9 4 the court disposed of an appeal by the State
Engineer on a jurisdictional point. The court held that the appeal was not timely
because not taken thirty days from the date of the original decree by the trial
court which was later amended on motion of the protestant. The State Engineer had not been a party to the amended decree. An appeal taken thirty days
from the date of the modified decree was not timely.
V
MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS AND INTERSTATE MATTERS

Darrv. Eldridge3 95 was an action to cancel a lease on premises upon which
a mineral water well was located. The lease provided for royalties based on the
quantity of water taken from the well. Originally the water was used for drinking purposes only but the lessee built baths and used the water for that purpose.
He paid royalties to the lessor on the basis of each bath rather than the quantity
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id. at 28, 287 P.2d at 228.
367 P.2d 708 (N.M. 1962) ; see note 163 supra.
68 N.M. 33, 357 P.2d 849 (1960).
66 N.M. 260, 346 P.2d 1041 (1959).
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of water used. The lessor filed suit for the royalties and the matter was later
settled. However, the lessee then piped in city water and discontinued use of
the mineral water. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that
the lessor could cancel the lease on the theory of "an implied covenant to use
reasonable diligence to market the mineral water."3 96 Darrthus indicates that
for some purposes mineral water in the ground may be like oil and gas. This, of
course, would raise additional questions of ownership. A recent Texas case39 7
has held that a reservation in a mineral lease in "oil, gas and other minerals"
does not include subsurface water. The Texas court said there was no doubt
"aboutwater being technically a mineral" but "we do not think water is a thing
of like kind to oil and gas" 398 so as to be included in the reservation.
United States v. Ballard, 99 in the United States District Court, arose out of
an action by the United States Park Service against eleven individuals. The New
Mexico State Game Commission intervened. The United States sought an injunction against pumping which was alleged to be depleting Rattlesnake Spring,
the source of supply for Carlsbad Cavern National Park. The court denied
the specific relief and instead entered an order entitling the parties to reopen
the judgment at a later time. The court required the parties to take steps to
measure the flow, examine the various uses and "work out a practical plan in
this regard. Accurate measurement should be continued for one year, at a minimum. If the parties are unable to agree as to the method for this measurement of
the flow from Rattlesnake Spring to all the parties hereto, the Court will be constrained to, itself, formulate such a program." 400
Natress v. United States, 401 also in the United States District Court, was
brought under a private law passed by Congress in 1956. The action was for the
taking of plaintiff's property by the flooding of the town of San Marcial, New
Mexico, in 1929. The theory of the case was that the erection and operation of
Elephant Butte Dam and Reservoir caused the flooding of San Marcial. The
court held that the plaintiff had not sustained the burden of proof on proximate
cause.
In 1955, while Texas v. New Mexico40 2 was still pending in the United
States Supreme Court, the United States District Court at El Paso handed
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

Id. at 264-, 346 P.2d at 1044.
Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
Id. at 851-52.
184- F. Supp. 1 (D.N.M. 1960).
Id. at 13.
186 F.Supp. 180 (D. N.M. 1960).

402. For chronology of case, see 342 U.S. 874 (1951), 342 U.S. 939 (1952), 343 U.S.
932 (1952), 344 U.S. 806 (1952), 344 U.S. 906 (1952), 347 U.S. 925 (1954), 348 U.S.
SOS (1954), 348 U.S.946 (1955), 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
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down an opinion 403 which concluded that in view of the Rio Grande Compact
among the states of Colorado, New Mexico and Texas, and in view of the
appropriations and contracts made by the United States, the City of El Paso
was not entitled to further appropriations from the Rio Grande. The decision
was modified on another point by the court of appeals in 1957.404 But the district
judge's examination of the facts and the law was fully approved:
The district judge, in his general grasp of the issues involved and
of the law relating thereto, and in the accuracy and precision of his
statement of the facts, out of which the issues arise, has done a thorough and workmanlike, indeed a monumental job of setting the case
forth in its particulars and as a whole.
In this view, it becomes unnecessary for us to discuss many of the
matters dealt with in the briefs. This is particularly so as to plaintiff's
contention, that the waters of the Rio Grande were committed to the
primary service of the Rio Grande Project prior to the effective date
of the Rio Grande compact between Colorado, New Mexico and
Texas, and the district judge erred in not definitely so declaring. It is
sufficient for the purpose of this appeal to say: that the district court,
on grounds sufficient to support the finding, adjudged that they were
committed to such primary service; that the water supply contracts
of Feb. 18, 1941 and December 1, 1944, between the United States,
the District, and the City of El Paso "are valid in all parts"; that the
contract of August 10, 1949, between the City and the District "is for
use in delivery of water to the defendant; and that, in our opinion, it
' 40 5
is valid in all its aspects."
The court of appeals held specifically that the United States was not bound
to do all reasonable rebuilding of bridges and make repairs in anticipation of
traffic needs under a prior agreement with the City of El Paso by which bridges
were maintained over a canal.
The district court's opinion had explored the implications of the Rio Grande
Compact:
The Rio Grande is the only international stream bordering on
Texas, and since that brings into play interests and relations between
nations, much of the control over the river and its waters must, necessarily, be left in the hands of the United States. The Republic of Mexico, as well as the United States, has interests at stake. The Rio Grande
403. El Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. I v. City of El Paso, 133 F.Supp.
894 (W.D. Teir. 1955).

404. El Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. City of El Paso, 243 F.2d 927
(5th Cir. 1957).
405. Id. at 929.
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has been the subject of Conventions and Treaties between these nations. It is seen in this lawsuit that a portion of the waters of the river,
in the upper part of its boundary segment, have been allocated to
Mexico and the United States is pledged to make delivery thereof at a
point opposite the defendant City. The International Boundary Commission of the United States and Mexico is entrusted with a measure
of continuing supervision and cooperation in questions and plans pertaining to the Rio Grande. In short, Texas does not and cannot have a
free hand with this particular river. The welfare of the people living
in the valleys along the Texas side of the Rio Grande may be more
closely tied to an agricultural economy dependent so wholly on irrigation than along any other river of Texas. This is enough to suggest,
no so much that the statute was well advised, but that, at least, it is
not irrational. The article in question is held constitutional.
The strongest bulwark of the plaintiffs' suit, in the present respect,
is the Rio Grande Compact between Colorado, New Mexico and
Texas. The relevant articles have already been quoted in a preceding
footnote. This Compact has a number of peculiar provisions. For
example, the water New Mexico must pass to Texas is delivered not
where the two States meet, but at San Marcial, New Mexico, more
than 100 miles above the point where the Rio Grande leaves New
Mexico. This delivery is made into the reservoir of the Elephant Butte
Dam, the principal structure of the Rio Grande Project. Some of this
water eventually goes to Mexico. The Compact, instead of leaving the
Texas share of the water open for disposition under the general water
statutes of Texas, plainly directs same for irrigation in the Project.
A large part of the Project lands are in New Mexico and, consequently, this water delivered to Texas goes to irrigate not only Texas
lands, but also New Mexico lands in the Project. The apparent reason for all this is that when the Compact was negotiated, the Rio
Grande Project, in all of its far flung works and physical properties
was, and for some time had been, sulerimposed on the Rio Grande
and its adjoining valleys all the way from the Elephant Butte Reservoir in New Mexico, to a point below Fabens in Texas and that fait
accompli colored the whole Compact as between New Mexico and
Texas. Perhaps the problem was handled in the only practicable way.
In any event, an analysis of the Compact shows convincingly that
the water belonging to Texas is definitely committed to the service of
the Rio Grande Project. This Compact is binding on Texas and the
defendant City and, for that matter, is binding on the inhabitants and
citizens of Texas.
The Territory of New Mexico put in force the water appropriations made under its laws years ago for the intended use of the incipient Rio Grande Project, which, from the standpoint of New Mexico,
meant more particularly what later became the Elephant Butte Irriga-

556
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tion District, and, naturally, New Mexico had no intention in the
Compact that the water delivered at San Marcial should, in any event,
all go downstream to Texas, with the result of leaving said local District waterless. Just as plainly, the United States never supposed that
its physical works and facilities were to be put in service to handle that
part of the water destined for Texas, only to have the Project lands
deprived o fit in favor of other uses under the law of Texas, thus, perhaps, imperiling the repayment program between the Project and the
United States. 406
Early in 1957, before the court of appeals reached its decision in the El Paso
case, the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed Texas v. New Mexico
in these words:
Per Curiam: The motions to amend the bill of complaint are denied. The motion to dismiss is granted and the bill of complaint is
dismissed because of the absence of the United States as an indispens40 7
able party.
The Master's Report submitted to the Supreme Court had listed and examined separately the 408 installations, constitutional and other obligations and
properties of the United States along the upper Rio Grande. Although Indian
rights were listed in the Master's Report, the Court's opinion is not authority
for the statement that the suit was dismissed because of Indian rights. The other
interests of the United States were equally relevant to the indispensability
question.
Although the Rio Grande Joint Investigation had included some ground
water examinations in parts of the upper valley, 409 the Rio Grande Compact
contains no reference to ground water. However, November 29, 1956, pursuant
to the New Mexico statutes, the State Engineer of New Mexico declared the
Rio Grande Underground Water Basin 410 extending from the Colorado Line
to Elephant Butte Dam. The Order is based on a theory of inter-relationship of
406. El Paso Water Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. City of El Paso, 133 F.Supp. 894,
906-07 (W.D. Tex. 1955).
407. 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
408. Report of the Special Master, October Term, 1953, No. 9, Original State of
Texas v. State of New Mexico, at 10-47 (Feb. 28, 1954), 347 U.S. 925 (Report filed).
409. See National Resources Committee, Regional Planning, Part VI, Upper Rio
Grande (Feb. 1938) vol. 1, at 13 et seq. This report followed the extensive Rio Grande
Joint Investigation.
410. Order No. 65, State Engineer of New Mexico, Nov. 29, 1956. See Bjorklund &
Maxwell, Availability of Ground Water in the Albuquerque Area, Bernalillo County
and Sandoval County, New Mexico, U.S.G.S. (Open File Rep., Jan. 1961), in cooperation with the State Engineer and the City of Albuquerque.
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ground and surface water. This Order has been challenged and upheld in
411
criminal proceedings.
On December 5, 1960, the Special Master in Arizona v. California,41 2 to
which New Mexico is a limited party, submitted his final report to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Although the Colorado Compact says nothing about
ground waters, the claim of New Mexico encompassed consideration of ground
water withdrawals in Virden Valley.41 Moreover, the New Mexico State Engi414
neer has, since the litigation began, declared basins in nearby areas.
Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co., 415 the so called Pueblo Rights Case, in 1959,
has large and foreseeable implications. The Supreme Court held that the city
and town of Las Vegas were entitled to historical pueblo rights and thus had a
superior claim on waters for municipal uses for the enlarged population. The
court said:

[T]he settlers who founded a colonization pueblo, in the process
of growth and expansion, carried with them the torch of priority, so
long as there was available water to supply the life blood of the expanded community. There is present in the doctrine discussed [pueblo
rights] the recognizable presence of lex suprema, the police power,
which furnishes answers to claims of confiscation always present when
private and public rights of claims collide. . . . So, here, we see in
the Pueblo Rights doctrine the elevation of the public good over the
416
claim of private right.
Although the case involved surface waters, the court made no distinction between its application to surface or ground waters in importing and applying the
California doctrine which encompasses ground waters:
It is an admitted fact that the doctrine of Pueblo Rights as we
understand and all the parties argue it is well recognized in the State
411. State v. Myers, 64 N.M. 186, 326 P.2d 1075 (1958).
412. 344 U.S. 919 (1953) (motion for leave to file a bill of complaint against the
State of California was granted) ; 364 U.S. 940 (1961) (Master's Report dated Dec. 5,
1960, was filed).
413. See Master's Report, p. 76, on claims of New Mexico and see p. 354 of the
Report (the Recommended Decree), and p. 355, where specific reference is made to
ground water sources and the Globe Equity Degree No. 59 (United States v. Gila Valley
Irrigation Dist., United States District Court for Arizona, June 29, 1935).
414. See, e.g., Orders numbered 81, 82, 83, of the State Engineer in 1960, which affect
the Gila-San Francisco, San Simon, and Virden Valley areas.
415. 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654 (1958) ; see also Cause No. 6828, June 8, 1961, which
is a sequel to the first case. The Supreme Court sustained the order dismissing the com-'
plaint. See Clark, The Pueblo Rights Doctrine in Newo Mexico, 35 N.M. Historical Rev.
265 (1960) ; Hutchins, Pueblo Water Rights in the West, 38 Texas L. Rev. 748 (1960).
416. Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 415, at,85, 343 P.2d at 668-69.
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of California. The parties agree that the question has not been determined in the State of New Mexico ...
We are unable to avoid the conclusion that the reasons which
brought the Supreme Court of California to uphold and enforce the
Pueblo Rights doctrine apply with as much force in New Mexico as
they do in California .... 417
The implications of the Cartwright decision with respect to ground water
withdrawals by a municipality were tested in the Albuquerque case 418 in which
the district judge held that the city had a pueblo grant. Although the Supreme
Court reversed on procedural and jurisdictional grounds, the decision indicates
approval of the inter-relationship theory of ground and surface waters in the Rio
Grande Valley which supports the declaration of the underground basin. The
court stated that "We feel constrained to hold that the State Engineer adopted
the only known plan to avoid impairment of existing rights. . . ." But on the
matter of the existence of a pueblo right the court held that the question and
the evidence submitted were not properly before the district court and "should be
stricken." A motion for rehearing was filed in the matter as this article was prepared for the printer. 419
A change in the Supreme Court's attitude on rehearing, or recognition of the
pueblo right, would mean that the city would be entitled to what water it needs
"for the Pueblo and its inhabitants, including the future growth and expansion
of said Pueblo" in the words of the court in Cartwright.420 Such an application
of the pueblo theory to ground water would allow Albuquerque to drill for and
pump large supplies from storage. It should be noted that under Spanish and
English law the landowner owned the water in and under his land,4 21 although
this is not the law in New Mexico today. The early colonization grants did not
contemplate ground water uses.
The applicable interstate compacts make no mention of ground waters. The
417. Id. at 80, 85, 343 P.2d at 665, 668.
418. See note 11, supra. See Albuquerque Journal A-8, Dec. 10, 1960, for comment on
district judge's comments from the bench.
419. The City of Albuquerque field the motion for rehearing on January 3, 1963. Other
cases involving Reynolds, State Engineer, are now pending before the court:
No. 6820 McGee v. Reynolds (submission stayed)
7064 Kelley v. Reynolds (submitted March 19, 1962)
6618 Reynolds v. Guadalupe County (pending on rehearing)
7133 Durand v. Reynolds (not at issue)
7096 Cross v. Reynolds (not at issue)
7204 Interstate Streams Comm'n v. Reynolds (not at issue)
420. Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co., 66 N.M. 64, 72, 343 P.2d 659 (1958).
421. See Bristor v. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 174, 176 (1953), citing 1 Kinney,
Irrigation and Water Rights § 563 (2d ed. 1912).
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effects of recognition of a pueblo right along the Rio Grande on interstate
relations and project developments are not hard to anticipate. Moreover, the
implications to be reckoned with in plans for the Upper Colorado Basin and
the San Juan-Chama development are obviously far reaching.
CONCLUSIONS

Recent legislative changes in both the surface and ground water statutes represent substantial improvements. Still others may be needed. Amendments have
been made through the traditional, pragmatic approach. This method has limited usefulness in bringing together surface and ground water law and policy.
An opportunity exists for clarification and simplification. The present statutory
structure could be culled and woven into one clear and comprehensive act. The
need for additional improvements in some areas of the law is urgent. For
example, the State Engineer should be required to promulgate his administrative rules and regulations at regular intervals. Also, there should be statutory recognition of the State Engineer's power to make initial determination of
rights as the first step in the adjudicatory process. The State Engineer is in
fact granting, transferring, conditioning and terminating "rights," yet the
claim is made that adjudication is entirely a matter for the courts. This Janus
attitude needs examination and exposure. A new type of adjudication procedure
expressly applicable to stream systems and ground water basins is needed. This
422
conclusion is obvious from a reading of State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sharp and
423
State ex rel. Reynolds v. W. S. Ranch Co.
The present administrative-adjudicatory process is unclear and inadequately
relates ground and surface water rules and policies; it is unnecessarily cumbersome because of the gaps between the statute law and case law which, in the
long run, may prove detrimental to the economic development of the state.
New procedures for adjudicating established rights or for granting new
rights should obviate subsequent claims as much as possible and minimaze conflicts over prior decrees. State v. W. S. Ranch Co. makes it abundantly plain
that provision should be made for the State Engineer to stand in the shoes of
claimants who do not appear in an adjudication that affects a large area, reservoir rights or interstate allocations.
The whole matter of publication or advertisement procedures for new applications, and particularly with respect to transfers of old rights to different
locations or changed uses, is in need of overhaul. Any new amendments should
consider the effect of publication on the rights of others such as lien holders and
creditors of persons with water rights.
422. 66 N.M. 192, 344 P.2d 943 (1959).
423. 69 N.M. 169, 364 P.2d 1036 (1961).
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The precise nature of the de novo appeal to the district court should be clarified by the legislature. At the present time the proceeding seems to be some-.
where between an original proceeding and an appeal on the record with evidence
admissible and merited weight given to the State Engineer's decision. This is not
what the statute specifies and is not what good administrative and judicial practice recommends.
The recent decisions have raised as well as settled several problems. The
Templeton 424 decision does not entirely conceal larger and more abstract prob-

lems involving rights to static head or pressure levels or to the form of diversion.
These problems cannot be resolved in terms of traditional appropriation doctrine. Other states are recognizing this. Templeton indicates that in New Mexico there is no "right" to the static level of water at a given level. However, that
conclusion is modified by the State Engineer's discretion to determine when a
well has been impaired by pumpage from other wells. In one case an increased
drawdown of 3.9 feet was not of sufficient magnitude to be called impairment.
This problem is related to the general policy of well spacing which is accepted
in some areas of the state and may be necessary in many others. An express statutory grant of authority may be appropriate even though such well spacing is
presently done under the general powers of the State Engineer. Rational controls which protect existing uses and the public interest in economic and general
social development will have to be devised with respect to greater control of
well sizes and the possibility of metering wells. The licensing powers in the
present legislation may already allow for additional control and inventory
devices.
The legislation and the decisions still do not furnish adequate criteria or recognizable norms for such constantly applied notions as "public interest" and
"beneficial use." The former is largely what the State Engineer determines it
to be in a given instance with no more standards to guide him than memory,
technical skill and some economic and political sensitivity. While these are large
endowments to hope for in any public official they may not be sufficient in difficult areas of decisions, as, for example, where oil and gas discovery and exploration may conflict with agricultural potential, or where municipal and industrial
growth conflicts with agriculture and the traditional "public interest" in certain recreational and wild life values. Beneficial use in the West is generally
defined in terms of an historical framework that has shifted drastically in the
past 20 years. For example, during this time the New Mexico court has found
that recreational uses are beneficial.
The early history of and the abolition in 1923 of the Board of Water Commissioners in New York should not prejudice reconsideration of the question
of separating policy making from administrative efficiency and enforcement
424. 65 N.M. 59, 332 P.2d 465 (1958).
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practices. This matter deserves attention with respect to the State Engineer's
policy making and policy enforcing functions and with respect to his membership on the Interstate Stream Commission. The State Engineer should not be
forced to be defensive or political about matters of science, technology and
administration. He should fully advise a Board and the Commission but he
should never be their alter ego or be required to act in their stead, or influence,
if not control, their decision by his equal status as a voting member. And neither
he nor members of his staff should be Interstate Compact commissioners in which
capacity all of their accumulated technical skills and competence may be wasted,
and political and institutional problems merely commence. Two heads add up
to more wisdom than one in this situation as in many others. The State Engineer's advice and recommendations should be a matter of record so that when
they are not followed or when they are approved posterity may know at least
who was deficient in judgment. The management of several large river basins
is not primarily a task for which engineers are notably more equipped than
others. For the wise use of natural resources is only incidentally a matter of
engineering and technology. The heart of the problem "lies in the social
42 5
order."

425. Enarson, Inter-University Cooperation for Research in Resources Field, Resources Development-Frontiers for Research 307 (Univ. Colo. Press, 1960), edited by
Franklin S. Pollack.

